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The WZB will
stage its 16th conference on Markets and Politics on October 17-18,
2008, in Berlin. This will be held in conjunction with the 2nd
conference of the
Research Network on Innovation and Competition
Policy (RNIC). During this conference, we intend to provide a forum
for international researchers, practitioners and network members to
present and discuss work concerning deterrence effects in
competition policy. The objective is to organize a small-scale event
that promotes interaction and discussion. Participation will mainly
be by invitation.
Deterrence is a
crucial aspect of competition policy, traditionally in the area of
cartels and price fixing, but also in the area of merger policy.
Although its main elements – detection and punishment – are
well-known, an evaluation of the deterrence impact remains
problematic. The major problem is its measurability, as it is
difficult to assess how laws, court decisions and authority actions
influence anti-competitive behavior by firms. This conference
intends to enhance our understanding of deterrence in the area of
competition policy, by discussing new methodological approaches for
measurement. Furthermore, we also aim to consider both empirically
and theoretically how new developments in competition policy may
influence deterrence (e.g. the introduction of private litigation).
Finally, deterrence, by changing firms’ behavior, then also has an
impact on resulting market structures and economic growth; these
themes will be dealt with as well. Some of the issues we are
interested in include:
·
The
development of new empirical approaches
·
Do
mistakes from authorities or uncertain environments influence
deterrence?
·
Does over-deterrence exist?
·
The
deterrence impact of plea bargaining on cartels
·
The
deterrence impact of bargaining over remedies on mergers
·
Policing actual merger cases versus deterring future mergers
·
Does
private litigation increase cartel deterrence?
·
Ex ante
versus ex post
deterrence
·
The
importance of precedents and court decisions in deterrence
·
The
deterrence impact on merger behavior and ultimately market structure
and growth
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