

Voter Rationalities in Different Electoral Systems

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1. Introduction

Is there an effect of electoral and party systems on the ability of voters to express and vote by their preferences? Under which conditions do they vote sincerely, or, to put it the other way around, in which contexts are they *not* forced into strategic voting? *Sincere voting* has institutional preconditions. This is true for strategic voting as well.

Voters must be able to relate their preferences to the political supply-side, that is to what parties and candidates have to offer. Sincere voting is defined as the possibility to maximize individual utility without compromise. However, results of electoral research have taught us that individual motivation and thus individual utilities are often quite complex. At the narrow end of the "funnel of causality" three political objects stand out if it comes to the explanation of voting behavior: *Parties*, *candidates*, and *policy issues*. It has been demonstrated across time and countries that generalized evaluations of parties, candidates, and issues do, indeed, matter for the electoral decision. It has also been shown that evaluations of these political objects are related to each other. Thus, a party may be preferred because of its candidates or policies or vice versa. However, in this study we want to consider citizens' evaluation of parties, candidates, and issues independently for analytical reasons. We want to explore which electoral and party systems support sincere voting best for each of three possible types of utility considerations. (1) It is reasonable to assume that a party is supported in elections because voters like it. (2) It is equally plausible, that citizens vote for a candidate they cherish. And (3) last not least it may be a particular match of issue preferences which tips an individual's scale for a particular party. Each of these three different motivations for sincere voting may be facilitated by institutional structures embodying different incentives. This is why we keep the three basic reasons to vote for a party separate. Only this way we will be in a position to test which types of institutional contexts facilitate sincere party-, candidate-, and issue-voting. We hypothesize that institutional context matters for an individual's possibility to vote sincerely. The party system and the electoral system are of particular concern. The party

system represents the supply-side. It defines the options between which voters can choose. The electoral system regulates access to the alternatives the party system offers.

2. Design of Data Analysis: The General Strategy

Which are the core predictors of voting behavior? Which of these core elements are likely to be influenced by the nature of the electoral system? Researchers at the University of Michigan first developed a socio-psychological model which describes the voting process in terms of a *funnel of causality* (Campbell et al., 1960, 1966). At the wide mouth of the funnel are the socio-economic cleavages which shape the long-term alliances between broad social groupings and political parties (Lipset/Rokkan, 1967 Pappi, 1976) and determine individual party identification. As we move down the causal funnel group loyalties are linked to more explicitly political attitudes which are of a more short-term nature. As already mentioned above, the three attitudes discussed by the Michigan team, have proven to have a direct and very strong impact on the citizens' vote: partisanship, candidate images and issue opinions. The broad cleavages of society are not generated or influenced by electoral rules. This is different, however, for short-term political attitudes towards parties, candidates, and issues. Their impact on the vote may well be modified by a particular electoral law or party system.

Thus, our general assumption that electoral institutions matter for sincere voting can be specified further. Different electoral institutions matter differently for the impact on the individual voting decision of the following three short-term factors: party evaluation, candidate evaluation, and issue evaluation.

In terms of research design we do not just relate voting behavior as the dependent variable to institutional characteristics of the polity as a set of independent variables. Rather, we relate differences in strength of *individual level relationships* to differences in macro characteristics of the general institutional context of an election. Thus, we aim at an explanation of *micro-micro variations* by macro variables. Stein Rokkan (1969, 1970, 1978), pioneer of macro-micro approaches to explain vote choice has called this particular research design the "true" macro-micro approach.

3. Sincere Voting and a General Vote Function

There are a number of vote functions which help to explain voting behavior. Best known are vote functions which are based on citizens' evaluations of the economy. They are of

predictive power in many different institutional settings. However, it would be heroic to assume that there is just one type of vote function. In fact there is a whole variety. Results of comparative research demonstrate, in addition, that vote functions are by no means robust and its explanatory power differs considerably between countries (Paldam, 1991). These differences also show between supporters of different political parties (Wessels, 1998). However, two arguments can be made to justify use of a single general vote function. *First*, we hypothesize that the vote function should co-vary systematically with the countries' differences in electoral and party systems. Thus, the general vote function is just meant to demonstrate that its predictive power is not the same everywhere. *Second*, the elements the general vote function consists of are all a result of an evaluation of different political objects by the voter. This variable is not constructed to *explain* voting behavior in a detailed fashion. Rather, its only purpose is to test the assumption that the individual level predictive power of the general vote function is not equal across countries which represent different institutional settings.

At the narrow end of the funnel of causality, individual utilities are defined in terms of party-, candidate- and policy-evaluation. It has been argued theoretically and demonstrated empirically that most utility functions are derived from a comparison of alternatives. This is also true for voting behavior. Most voters compare between what is offered for choice before they cast their ballot (Klingemann, 1986). The probability of voting for the best-liked party in a set of parties varies with the degree of attraction ego feels for these alternative parties. This phenomenon is called differential or *weighted utility*. Strategic considerations of voters may also come into play. Cox (1997: 73ff) has proposed a theoretical model of strategic voting consisting of the following three elements: *preferences, beliefs, and expectations*. Beliefs and expectations are important for strategic voting. Beliefs relate to the perceived distribution of preferences in the electorate. Expectations are about the parties' or candidates' likelihood of winning in the election. For example a vote for a party or candidate which one likes best may be considered "wasted" because it is believed that they will not make it to parliament or public office. Thus, maximizing utility under certain conditions of believed distributions of preferences for parties in the electorate and resulting expectations of who wins or loses may result in voting for a party different from the voter's first choice. In this case utility is defined in terms of winners and losers.

These considerations have guided construction of the specific and general vote functions which are used in this analysis. They are defined as follows:

1. The specific vote functions

- *Party utility*. Party utility is defined by the score a party gets on the eleven-point like-dislike scale.

- *Candidate utility*. Candidate utility is defined by the score a candidate gets on the eleven-point like-dislike scale
- *Policy utility*. Policy utility is defined as the difference between the respondent's position on a left-right self-placement scale and the perceived left-right position of the different political parties. The smaller the difference, the greater the policy utility for the respondent.
- *Weighted party utility*. The weighted party utility score is calculated by multiplying the score for the most liked party with the difference of the liking scores for the first and for the second most liked party.
- *Weighted candidate utility*. The weighted candidate utility score is calculated by multiplying the score for the most liked candidate with the difference of the liking scores for the first- and for the second most liked candidate.
- *Weighted policy utility*. The following components are used to generate the weighted policy utility score: (1) calculate the largest difference between the respondent's position on the left-right dimension and the perceived position of the political parties on the left-right dimension; (2) calculate the smallest difference between the respondent's position on the left-right dimension and the perceived position of the political parties on the left-right dimension; (3) subtract the latter from the former; (4) calculate the difference between the two parties which are closest and second closest to the respondent's own position on the left-right dimension; (5) multiply this difference with the difference score obtained by (3).
- *Strategic party utility*. The strategic party utility score is defined by multiplying the score of the most liked party on the like-dislike scale multiplied by percent of respondents who intend to vote for the respective party.

2. The general vote function

The general vote function is composed of the specific vote functions and formally defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Individual vote decision} = & a + b_1(\text{party utility}) + b_2(\text{candidate utility}) + b_3(\text{policy utility}) \\ & + b_4(\text{weighted party utility}) + b_5(\text{weighted candidate utility}) + \\ & b_6(\text{weighted policy utility}) + b_7(\text{strategic party utility}) + \\ & e(\text{error term}) \end{aligned}$$

For the purposes of this paper the individual vote decision is defined in a specific way. It is meant to measure *sincere* voting, that is voting by ones "true" preferences or utilities. As outlined above, preferences relate to parties, candidates, and policies. Thus, these then are the three different types of sincere voting. We define them as follows:

- *Party voting*. Sincere party voting is defined as voting for the party which has received the best score on the like-dislike scale. If two parties are tied, voting for one or the other is regarded sincere.
- *Candidate voting*. Sincere candidate voting is defined as voting for the candidate who has received the best score on the liking scale. If two candidates are tied, voting for one or the other is regarded sincere.
- *Left-Right policy voting*. Sincere left-right policy voting is defined in terms of the smallest difference between the respondent's position on the left-right dimension and the party which is perceived to be closest to this position. If two parties are tied, voting for one or the other is regarded sincere.

Having defined the elements of the micro-micro relationships of sincere voting we now turn to the macro variations in electoral and party systems. Finally, we want to specify effects of macro characteristics on micro-micro relationships.

3. Hypotheses about the Impact of Party Systems and Electoral Systems on Vote Choice: The Demand Side

We have argued that partisanship, candidate orientation and policy orientation are determinants of vote choice which are most susceptible to institutional arrangements. However, we have to be more precise in terms of expectations. What are the incentives generated by different institutional settings which individual citizen would be ready to consider when it comes to a voting decision?

Electoral systems are usually described by three characteristics. First; the electoral system defines how citizens have to cast their votes and how these votes are counted. Second, it defines the districts in which voting actually takes place. Third, it specifies the rules of how to translate votes into seats (Cox, 1997:38). In our analysis we deal with self-reported vote for a particular party. We do not consider more complex choice patterns. Thus, the first characteristic need not be discussed in any more detail. The two other characteristics, however are important for our analysis and deserve more attention. Combined these two characteristics of an electoral system constitute what we call an electoral system's *translation dimension*. This dimension is operationally defined by the number of seats which are allocated in a particular district on the one hand and by the degree to which the proportionality principle governs the translation of votes into seats on the other.

Party systems can also be described effectively by just a limited number of characteristics. Prominent among these characteristics are (1) the number of parties which

constitute the party system, (2) the degree of political polarization along programmatic dimensions, and the degree of (3) political fragmentation. In our analysis we concentrate on two characteristics: (1) the effective number of parties and (2) the degree of differentiation of the policy supply-side of the party system. The effective number of parties define the alternatives between which voters can choose (if they do not want to waste their votes on a small "non-effective" party). Differentiation of the policy supply-side indicates the range of policy options a voter can support. We have measured the policy supply side of parties by content analysis of the parties' election manifestos (Budge et al., 1987; Klingemann et al. 1994). Positions of parties on the left-right dimension are determined by generalizing from their positions on specific policies, such as promoting freedom or democracy, market- or state-economy, anti- or pro-welfare policies and foreign policy positions which either emphasize security by a strong military defense or security by cooperation and peace and détente policies. The score representing policy differentiation was generated by calculating and adding absolute distances on this left-right dimension between all possible pairs of parties and dividing that sum by the number of parties compared. Combined we call these two characteristics (the effective number of parties and the degree of differentiation of policy supply), the *supply dimension* of a party system.

What is the possible impact of the electoral system and the party system on the vote decision of the individual citizen? Let us turn to the translation dimension first. Cox (1997:228 ff.) has demonstrated that district magnitude is the best characteristic of the strength of an electoral system in PR or SNTV systems. District magnitude determines the pattern of candidate locations (i.e. supply-side structures; Cox 1997:228ff.) In multi-member districts district magnitude restricts the number of viable candidates to district magnitude + 1 (Cox, 1997: 99ff.). Thus, district magnitude is of crucial importance for sincere voting and its opposite: strategic voting. The larger the district magnitude, the more candidates can win a seat. Cox defines a *threshold*. He argues that "strategic voting ought to fade out in multi-member districts when the district magnitude gets much above five. The logic behind this argument is simply that it gets harder and harder to satisfy the informational assumptions of the model [of strategic voting] as district magnitude increases." (Cox 1997: 100). Proportionality has a similar effect and is statistically closely related to district magnitude. However the effects are not the same and must be considered separately. The higher the degree of disproportionality in the translation of votes into seats, the higher the likelihood of wasted votes. Thus our general hypothesis reads as follows: sincere voting should be facilitated by electoral systems which are characterized by a high district magnitude and/or a high degree of proportionality.

With regard to the policy supply dimension, we argue that it is easier for citizens who vote in party systems which are characterized by a differentiated policy supply, to find a party with a policy profile they really like. Thus policy voting can be more sincere in a party system in which more parties with specific programs which are different constitute the supply-side and vice versa.

The following hypotheses derive from these considerations:

Hypothesis 1: The less restrictive the electoral system and the more alternatives (supply) offered by the party system, the more the system should be "partyized". On the opposite: The more restrictive the electoral system and the smaller the number of alternatives (supply) the more the system should be "personalized".

This means that criteria for voting should be more related to parties and policies in the first case and more to candidates in the latter. Determinants of vote choice (vote functions) which are based on individual evaluations of political objects should more directly translate into sincere voting in systems which are governed by the principle of proportionality and where political supply shows a high degree of differentiation. This should also result in allowing the respective evaluative criteria to have a higher impact on the vote function in such systems as compared to others.

Hypothesis 2: Sincere voting for a particular party should be caused more strongly by the respective evaluative criteria and less so by other factors. More specifically, party voting as defined above should be most strongly related to party evaluation; candidate voting to candidate evaluation; and policy (left-right) voting to the evaluation of policy distances

The "party voting", "candidate voting" and "policy voting" hypotheses can be specified further by taking into account more explicitly the characteristics of the electoral and the party system.

Hypothesis 3a "Party voting": The less an electoral system constrains translation of votes into seats, and the more differentiated the political supply-side, the more party voting should be determined by party evaluation and vice versa.

The expectations regarding sincere candidate and policy (left-right) voting are as follows:

Hypothesis 3b "Candidate voting": The more an electoral system constrains translation of votes into seats, and the less differentiated the political supply-side, the more candidate voting should be determined by candidate evaluation and vice versa.

Hypothesis 3c: "Policy Voting" (here defined as left-right voting): The less an electoral system constrains translation of votes into seats, and the more differentiated the political supply-side, the more left-right voting should be determined by policy distance evaluation and vice versa.

4. Characteristics of Electoral and Party Systems - Defining the Macro Variables

For the analysis we construct indicators which represent the *translation* and the *supply dimension* of electoral and party systems. The characteristics of the specific systems under investigation are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Characteristics of Electoral and Party Systems of 16 CSES-Countries

Country	Type of Electoral System	District Magnitude, weighted ^a	Log (weighted district magnitude)	Effective Number of Parties	Disproportionality (% v. Votes/% Seats)	Left-Right Range of Party Manifestos at Election ^b	Left-Right Supply of Party Manifestos at Election ^c
Australia	Maj (AV)	1,00	0,00	2,42	19,86	43,05	28,00
Czech Republic	PR m	25,00	1,40	4,85	11,32	39,77	15,47
Germany	Mix s+m	10,75	1,03	2,78	5,88	54,88	25,96
Hungary	Mix s+m	6,30	0,80	2,89	12,36	27,72	14,52
Japan	Mix s+m	7,87	0,90	3,95	18,57	26,93	13,58
Mexico	Mix s+m	10,25	1,01	2,28	8,68	3,44	4,32
Netherlands	PR m	150,00	2,18	5,38	3,27	30,87	14,36
New Zealand	Mix s+m	25,75	1,41	2,16	6,53	39,70	20,94
Norway	PR m	8,68	0,94	4,15	6,14	75,31	28,78
Poland	PR s+m	7,50	0,88	3,85	18,48	39,97	12,84
Spain	PR m	6,73	0,83	2,67	8,23	29,12	16,15
Taiwan	Mix s+m	21,04	1,32	2,17	-	-	-
USA	Plu s	1,00	0,00	2,00	3,59	28,84	28,84
Great Britain	Plu s	1,00	0,00	2,26	21,27	19,24	12,83
Israel	PR m	120,00	2,08	4,38	3,89	83,33	37,81
Romania	PR s+m	7,81	0,89	5,83	18,01	45,79	21,03

a District Magnitude, weighted: Number of seats/number of districts per tier weighted by number of seats, all weighted values added and divided by number of total seats.

b Left-Right range of party platform of relevant parties. Party Manifestoes Project, WZB.


c Left-Right Supply: derived from left-right scores for relevant parties from party manifestoes. Left-Right differences between all party pairs averaged.

- No data available

For various reasons (missing data etc.) we had to omit three countries from our analyses (USA, Israel, Romania). For the remaining countries we created our indices as follows. Variables representing the translation dimension (i.e. the electoral system, log

disproportionality and log district magnitude) as well as the variables representing the supply dimension (i.e. party system, effective number of parties and differentiation of political supply) have all been standardized as a 100 point scale. They were then added and logged. The result is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Translation and Supply Dimension of Political Systems



Scores for the indices representing the two dimensions result from a similar standardization procedure. Thus, statistical effects can be compared easily in any analysis of macro-micro relationships.

5. Is "Sincere Voting" really Sincere?

Hypothesis 2 states that vote functions for the three types of "sincere voting" defined above (i.e. party voting, candidate voting and left-right voting) should be dominated by the evaluation of the respective theoretically relevant attitude object. More specifically: party voting should be most strongly influenced by party orientation, candidate voting by candidate orientation and policy voting by policy orientation. This assumes that "sincere

voting" is reasoned voting and does not happen just by chance. There is a possibility that the best liked party turns out also to be closest in left-right terms. However, in this situation we assume for the sincere party voter that liking the party, not left-right orientation, should have the strongest predictive power for the vote. Statistically this means that we underestimate the real effects. Thus, our test is conservative by definition. This is true because all three variables, party orientation, candidate orientation and left-right orientation, are closely related. We have argued that it is for analytical reasons that we keep the effects separate. Empirically one third of the respondents which can be classified by all three characteristics (overall mean across countries) party voting, candidate voting and left-right voting are related to the same party.

In the first step of our analysis we calculate individual level regressions. We want to test whether or not an increase in sincere voting is most strongly related to the evaluation of the respective prominent attitude object. Thus, we have to compare the slopes generated by the three different independent variables¹. As can be seen from Table 2 results support the general hypothesis, although one has to take into account that effects are confounded.

Table 2: Relative Impact of Party-, Candidate, and Policy Evaluation in Vote Functions for Three Types of "Sincere Voting"

	PVote, B of		KVote B of		LR-Vote B of	
	Pmax/Kmax	Pmax/LR	KMax/PMax	KMax/LR	LRDiff/Pmax	LRDiff/Kmax
Aus	9,5	7,9	1,0	1,7	1,0	13,3
Cze	19,5	0,9	7,4	0,8	10,0	5,5
Ger	1,1	0,3	24,2	1,3	17,3	28,3
Hun	3,3	1,2	8,8	1,7	12,2	17,5
Jap	1,8	0,8	0,1	0,1	2,0	1,5
Mex	4,1	3,1	0,5	1,0	1,8	4,0
Net	1,1	0,3	13,3	0,4	3,2	31,5
Nze	1,4	0,4	1,8	0,8	8,0	9,3
Nor	4,8	0,8	0,6	1,0	14,9	52,6
Pol	12,6	0,2	2,2	2,0	3,8	18,8
Spa	2,0	1,9	1,5	0,7	1,4	2,3
Tai	0,6	1,2	15,2	2,3	0,3	11,2
GB	0,6	0,3	4,2	1,3	4,9	12,1
Corr with						
LTrans+	-0,099	-0,376	0,388	-0,355	0,243	0,285
LSupply+	0,264	-0,096	0,147	-0,230	0,497	0,592

¹ The results (i.e. B and adj. R-square are presented in the appendix. The explanatory power of vote functions differs considerably between countries but in most cases satisfies our criteria.

What can be learned from Table 2 is the following: the ratio of the effects, i.e. the b's in the regression, exceed 1 most of the time which means that the variable expected to have the strongest effect does indeed have the strongest effect. However, this is not always the case and ratios differ quite strongly across countries. Hypothesis 2 formulates the expectation that the relative strength of the independent variables should be contingent on certain characteristics of the electoral and party systems. This is exactly what we find and the result is quantified by the correlations shown at the bottom of Table 2. In general, it turns out that the less restrictive an electoral system and the more differentiated its political supply-side, the stronger the effect of the expected variable as compared to the other variables. The opposite is the case with regard to the ratio of effects of party and candidate liking related to the left-right difference. This finding is also congruent with our initial expectations. In sum, results hint at the fact, that electoral and party systems do indeed matter for individual vote choice. Individual-level effects are contingent on macro characteristics of political systems to a certain degree.

6. Conditioned Vote Functions: The Effect of Macro Characteristics of the Electoral and Party Systems on the Effects of Individual Level Relationships

Our analysis strategy in this section is to explain variations in the size of effects in individual level voting models (micro-micro relationships) by macro characteristics of the electoral and party systems. Thus, we look at the institutional conditions which shape vote decisions, or to put it differently, at conditional effects. These effects cannot be modeled at the individual level because they concern relationships measured by multivariate regression analysis. It is quite easy to compare effects of different sets of variables which are scaled the same way. The unstandardized regression coefficients will be used as input from the micro side. They indicate the degree of increase or decrease in "sincere voting" caused by the respective variable, that is its predictive power. Often standardized regression coefficients are used to determine which variable matters the most. However, this strategy is inadequate for a comparison between samples which differ in terms of variance. In this situation the unstandardized regression coefficient is the more adequate measure. The unstandardized regression coefficient has an additional advantage. It can be put to a better use if it comes to description.

Turning to sincere *party vote* first and relating results to expectations of hypothesis 3 conclusions are as follows: The more open (or less constraining) the electoral system and the more differentiated the political supply-side, the stronger the effect of party liking (PMax). Thus, expectations of hypothesis 3 are confirmed. However, obviously, results do

not always meet criteria of statistic significance. Given the few number of cases (13 cases) in the analysis, this does not come as a surprise. In this situation it is more instructive to look at the general structure of relationships rather than test levels of significance.

Figure 2 shows the impact of the three independent variables party liking (PMax), candidate liking (KMax) and left-right difference (10-LR-Diff) on party voting in relation to the two macro dimensions *translation* (L Trans +) and *supply* (L Supply +). Besides the positive relationship between effects of party liking (Pmax) and the two macro dimensions, results also show, that the effect of candidate liking (Kmax) is largest in most restrictive and narrow supply systems. This was also expected by our hypotheses. Furthermore, the effect of the (reversed) left-right difference also is positively related to open electoral and differentiated party systems (Figure 2).

Results for sincere *candidate voting*, i.e. voting for a party whose leading candidate voters like most, do not confirm the hypothesis. First, there is no relationship between electoral system and increase in the probability to vote for the party of the most liked candidate. Second, the relation with party system supply is weak and in the wrong direction. Figure 3 shows that countries are almost scattered at random in the space defined by the transformation and supply dimensions. Thus, for the impact of candidate liking on candidate vote electoral and party system characteristics are nearly irrelevant. Two reasons help to understand the failure to find the expected relationships. First, we have a specification problem because the dependent variables are confounded. Testing the hypothesis with the subset of respondents for whom the variables are not confounded may have a different result. Second, like-dislike evaluations are only available for leading party figures. Thus, we are unable to test the hypothesis for the large group of "normal" candidates. This seriously limits an estimation of the importance of personal or nominal vote. There is evidence that candidate-liking and especially candidate performance matters for nominal vote at the district level in mixed electoral systems (Klingemann and Wessels, 2000).

With regard to left-right voting, design features are less critical although here, too, we have to live with confounded dependent variables, thus underestimating their effects. For sincere left-right voting, results are much more supportive of the hypothesis at least as far as its first part is concerned. The size of the effect of left-right distance on left-right sincere voting increases with the degree the electoral system is unconstrained or weak and with the degree of differentiation of the political supply-side of the party system (Figure 4). Weakness of the electoral system means the opposite of how Cox has defined the strength of electoral systems (Cox, 1997). Thus, results for an impact of macro variables are quite supportive, too, with regard to voting for a party which is closest in terms of left-right distance.

Figure 2: The Effect of Party Liking, Candidate Liking and Left-Right Distance on "Sincere" Party Voting in different Electoral and Party Systems






Figure 3: The Effect of Party Liking, Candidate Liking and Left-Right Distance on "Sincere" Candidate Voting in different Electoral and Party Systems



Overall then we do observe a sizable impact of macro conditions on sincere party voting and sincere policy (left-right) voting whereas there is no such effect with respect to sincere candidate voting. This summary finds its visual expression in Figure 4.

Figure 4: The Effect of Party Liking, Candidate Liking and Left-Right Distance on "Sincere" Left-Right Voting in different Electoral and Party Systems



It is interesting to note that the impact of macro variables is strongest on those individual level determinants of vote choice which are characteristic for the three types of sincere voting for theoretical reasons. For sincere party voting, party evaluation should be the most important variable and empirical results support this expectation (Table 2). The effects of the macro variables on the strength of the relation of party vote and party liking are larger for five out of the six macro variables than for the other two types of voting (Table 3, bold faced figures). The same is true for candidate voting and candidate liking for three of the six macro variables, and for left-right voting and left-right distance for all six relationships with the macro variables. Thus, we again find that our hypothesis regarding sincere candidate voting is not supported by the data.

More important, however is the fact that we can demonstrate that macro variables do indeed have strong effects on the micro-micro relations as specified in the individual vote functions. Consider, for example, the variation of effects of party liking (Pmax) on sincere party voting (Pvote) under different macro conditions. If the *supply dimension* is increased or decreased by one standard unit, the explanatory power of the individual level independent variables for party voting changes in the order of 10 percent points. This is at least true theoretically. Empirically we observe a decrease of explanatory power in sincere party voting by 2 percent points in case of a situation of a strongly restricted supply side. whereas there is an increase of about 4 percent points in party systems which are characterized by a differentiated supply-side. Thus, empirically, the effects of macro variables cause a range in the effects of micro variables from -2 to +4. Even stronger effects of the supply dimension can be observed with respect to the effect of left-right differences (Table 3).

Table 3: Slopes between Effects (B's) and Macro Characteristics
(Macro Characteristics Standardized, Slopes comparable)

		%100- Ldisprop	%LDMag	%Ltrans +	% EffPar	% LR- Supply	% Supply +
Pvote	Pmax	0,019	0,021	0,023	0,128	0,015	0,099
Kvote	Pmax	0,011	0,012	0,013	0,047	0,041	0,072
LR-Vote	Pmax	0,011	0,006	0,010	-0,037	0,012	-0,012
Pvote	Kmax	-0,006	-0,009	-0,008	-0,080	0,003	-0,049
Kvote	Kmax	-0,007	0,002	-0,004	0,009	0,047	0,053
LR-Vote	Kmax	-0,007	0,004	-0,003	0,047	-0,014	0,008
Pvote	10-ADLR	0,016	0,029	0,025	0,145	0,026	0,121
Kvote	10-ADLR	0,012	0,028	0,022	0,129	0,022	0,106
LR-Vote	10-ADLR	0,034	0,031	0,038	0,147	0,063	0,170

Bold: effects strongest where expected. Significance and correlations see appendix.

Since effects of macro variables on the effects of micro-micro relationships in individual vote functions are quite strong, we conclude that sincere voting is supported differently in different political settings. The question is, whether one can turn the argument around. Do voters take into account strategic considerations, when sincere voting is more difficult?

7. If Voting Is Not Sincere, Is It Strategic?

To explain strategic voting it is not enough to consider preferences for political objects. *Expectations* about a party's or candidate's probability to "win" in the next election are needed in addition. In this analysis we do not intend to elaborate on details of strategic voting theoretically or empirically (see Cox, 1997, in that respect). However, one particular aspect of the general problem is of relevance to our study and we are in a position to analyze it empirically. The question is: Are the "positive" effects of weak electoral systems and of a highly differentiated political supply-side on sincere voting mirrored by "negative" effects of strategic voting?

In our general vote function, only one element included in the "weighted utility" measures is related to strategic considerations. As the reader may recall we have weighted the effect of party liking by party support as revealed in the survey. This weighting corresponds to the concept of *expectations* in theories of strategic voting. Thus, the utility of a party for a voter is not just determined by pure preferences but by considering probabilities of winning as well. A strategic voter will not vote for a party which he expects to lose in the next election. In this respect he will not be a sincere voter.


Here, macro considerations come into play. First, if electoral systems are weak (i.e. less restrictive) wasted votes may just not be a possibility and voters do not have to bother about them. Second, the probability to find a party matching one's preferences is higher in systems with a more differentiated political supply-side.

Thus, the hypothesis regarding strategic voting is very similar to hypothesis 3, but, of course, it is in the opposite direction. The less restrictive an electoral system and the more differentiated the political supply-side, the lower the necessity and importance of strategic voting. We expect an impact of the macro variables on the effect of the weighted utility variable for party voting, candidate voting and left-right voting.

Figure 5 shows the results. Both the supply and the translation dimension matter for the importance of strategic voting. Coefficients are in the expected direction, except for the impact of electoral system on the effect of candidate liking for party voting. Slopes are negative and quite steep. Thus, the importance of strategic considerations in the vote

function at the individual level decreases considerable and even becomes negative in systems with a less restrictive electoral and a more differentiated party system.

Figure 5: The Impact of Strategic Factors on Individual Vote Decision in different Electoral and Party Systems



There is a clear answer to our initial question. If structural conditions do not support sincere voting, citizens resort to strategic voting. In this regard electoral institutions are not only supportive of certain types of preferred behaviors they also restrict other types of behaviors as well.

8. Summary of Results

We have discussed the problem whether or not *sincere voting* as an individual level phenomenon is supported or restricted by structural characteristics of different electoral and party systems. *Sincere voting* was defined on the individual level in terms of three vote functions. *Sincere party voting* was assumed, when party evaluation was more important for the individual citizen than candidate or policy (left-right) evaluation and it also proved to be the strongest predictor of vote choice empirically. A similar argument was made for *sincere candidate and sincere policy (left-right) voting*. Macro characteristics of electoral and party systems were summarized by two indices representing a *translation* and a *supply dimension*. The predictive power of party-, candidate- and policy- (left-right) orientation on the different types of sincere voting was tested empirically on the individual level using the logic of regression analysis. In the next step of our analysis we made an effort to explain variations in the strength of these micro-micro relations by variations in characteristics of the macro context in which elections take place.

Empirical results support the following conclusions:

1. Sincere voting exists for the three different vote functions as specified in this study. Empirical results show that in all instances it is the expected independent variables which turns out to have the largest explanatory power.
2. However, as hypothesized, strength and direction of these micro-micro relationships are influenced by characteristics of the institutional structure of the macro context. We have tested macro effects by differences in electoral and party systems. If electoral systems are weak and party systems offer a differentiated supply-side, sincere voting is facilitated and vice versa. This is strongly supported for sincere party voting as well as for sincere policy (left-right) voting whereas we did not find much evidence for a similar effect on sincere candidate voting.
3. Sincere voting and strategic voting are contradictory types of behavior. We have demonstrated that strategic voting is encountered more often in structural contexts which are constraint and do not offer much room for individual choice.

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Appendix

Table A1: Party Sympathy and Voting for Closest Party (Party Voting)

Country	PMax	PSec	PLast	Pref_0_1	P_Tie	DPMaSec	DPMaLas	DPSecLas	PVote	PVote_T
Australia	9,07	7,05	2,94	0,06	0,30	1,72	6,13	4,28	0,78	0,82
Czech Republic	9,51	7,07	1,63	0,01	0,15	2,28	7,88	5,48	0,79	0,84
Germany	8,84	6,70	1,30	0,03	0,26	1,83	7,56	5,42	0,63	0,66
Hungary	9,42	7,02	1,99	0,05	0,20	2,08	7,44	5,08	0,80	0,85
Japan	7,91	6,16	3,18	0,11	0,30	1,57	4,75	3,21	0,68	0,76
Mexico	8,60	5,81	2,58	0,09	0,23	2,55	6,05	3,45	0,65	0,70
Netherlands	8,73	7,36	3,77	0,03	0,32	1,17	4,97	3,74	0,59	0,67
New Zealand	9,21	7,22	2,45	0,04	0,27	1,67	6,76	4,90	0,72	0,80
Norway	9,16	7,46	2,55	0,01	0,19	1,58	6,62	4,96	0,73	0,82
Poland	9,22	7,12	2,38	0,12	0,24	1,86	6,88	4,89	0,71	0,75
Spain	8,05	5,14	2,34	0,03	0,23	2,60	5,70	3,03	0,60	0,63
Taiwan	7,23	4,92	3,85	0,19	0,34	1,88	3,35	1,64	0,54	0,58
USA	8,32	5,25	4,15	0,02	0,16	2,87	4,17	1,34	0,68	0,72
Great Britain	8,82	6,06	3,13	0,04	0,18	2,52	5,70	3,07	0,77	0,81
Israel	9,14	6,95	2,04	0,04	0,27	1,83	7,10	4,93	0,07	0,10
Romania	9,31	7,02	2,90	0,13	0,29	1,79	6,44	4,30	0,19	0,20

Variable Description:

PMax: Average party sympathy scale score for most liked party.

PSec: Average party sympathy scale score for second most liked party.

PLas: Average party sympathy scale score for least liked party.

Pref_0_1: Portion of respondents with either only one party scored or no party.

P_Tie: Proportion of respondents with tie between scores for parties on party sympathy scale.

DPMaSec: Average difference on party sympathy scale between most and second most liked party.

DPMaLas: Average difference on party sympathy scale between most and least liked party.

DPSecLas: Average difference on party sympathy scale between second most and least liked party.

PVote: Proportion of respondents voting for most liked party. Ties not considered.

PVote_T: Proportion of respondents voting for most liked party. Ties considered.

Table A2: Candidate Evaluation and Vote for Party of Closest Candidate (Candidate-Voting)

Country	KMax	KSec	KLast	KPref_0_1	KTie	DKMaxSec	DKMaxLas	DKSecLas	KVote	KVote_T
Australia	8,85	6,64	2,93	0,04	0,28	1,87	5,90	3,92	0,70	0,74
Czech Republic	9,36	7,00	1,67	0,01	0,22	2,02	7,69	5,41	0,73	0,79
Germany	8,87	7,18	2,94	0,02	0,33	1,31	5,94	4,36	0,55	0,61
Hungary	9,21	6,98	2,02	0,04	0,28	1,85	7,19	5,07	0,73	0,79
Japan	8,24	6,61	3,51	0,11	0,33	1,39	4,76	3,37	0,54	0,60
Mexico	8,55	5,99	4,78	0,14	0,24	2,22	3,83	1,56	0,47	0,56
Netherlands	8,88	7,39	4,29	0,03	0,33	1,14	4,61	3,26	0,43	0,51
New Zealand	9,00	6,92	2,35	0,02	0,29	1,68	6,66	4,69	0,61	0,69
Norway	8,96	7,36	2,83	0,01	0,29	1,35	6,14	4,67	0,45	0,58
Poland	8,89	6,72	2,32	0,09	0,28	1,79	6,59	4,54	0,58	0,64
Spain	8,22	5,20	2,60	0,03	0,22	2,73	5,62	2,82	0,56	0,59
Taiwan	8,51	6,87	3,91	0,15	0,39	1,19	4,62	3,41	0,42	0,43
USA	8,56	5,47	3,75	0,01	0,13	2,86	4,81	1,93	0,65	0,68
Great Britain	9,05	6,42	3,91	0,03	0,23	2,27	5,15	2,71	0,71	0,76
Israel	9,43	6,82	2,44	0,03	0,27	2,07	7,01	4,55	0,07	0,10
Romania	10,09	8,01	3,47	0,05	0,30	1,49	6,64	4,66	0,07	0,07

Variable Description:

KMax: Average candidate sympathy scale score for most liked candidate.

KSec: Average candidate scale score for second most liked candidate.

KLas: Average candidate sympathy scale score for least liked candidate.

Pref_0_1: Portion of respondents with either only one candidate scored or no candidate.

KTie: Proportion of respondents with tie between scores for parties on candidate sympathy scale.

DKaxSec: Average difference on candidate sympathy scale between most and second most liked candidate.

DKaxLas: Average difference on candidate sympathy scale between most and least liked candidate.

DKaxSec: Average difference on candidate sympathy scale between second most and least liked candidate.

KVote: Proportion of respondents voting party of most liked candidate. Ties not considered.

KVote_T: Proportion of respondents voting party of most liked candidate. Ties considered.

Table A3: Left-Right-Distances between Voters and Parties and Vote for Closest Party (Left-Right Vote)

Label	DLRP1	DLRP2	DLRPLA	ADLRP1	ADLRP2	ADLRPLA	LRP1P2	LRP1PL	LR_Vote
Australia	-0,385	0,1834	0,8	1,1766	1,7215	3,6016	-0,4452	-2,3726	0,49
Czech Republic	-0,3159	-0,7003	0,7261	1,4101	2,2967	5,0038	-0,9544	-3,607	0,53
Germany	-0,3674	-0,5336	-4,0874	1,6122	1,9884	5,5512	-0,3808	-3,964	0,41
Hungary	-0,2144	-0,1296	-1,3946	1,4582	1,9851	4,6373	-0,6383	-3,1992	0,54
Japan	-0,839	0,4245	1,8442	1,9445	2,5265	4,0043	-0,7689	-2,18	0,43
Mexico	-0,4572	1,3393	2,8398	2,4986	3,4826	4,4756	-1,0767	-1,9206	0,45
Netherlands	0,3298	0,5101	-0,804	1,2996	1,9105	3,1219	-0,7291	-1,8125	0,50
New Zealand	0,0192	0,0967	-0,4054	1,2739	2,1475	4,7273	-0,9865	-3,491	0,54
Norway	-0,4468	-0,4333	-0,9227	1,2306	1,9336	4,4061	-0,7221	-3,2015	0,50
Poland	-0,066	-0,2442	0,8094	1,8991	2,316	4,9017	-0,5104	-3,0265	0,49
Spain	-0,4407	-0,0867	-1,1671	1,2064	2,9007	3,6498	-1,8132	-2,4364	0,56
Taiwan	-0,2583	0,4386	0,9188	1,3988	2,1368	2,3852	-0,656	-1,035	0,59
USA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Great Britain	-0,309	0,2955	-0,6801	1,4252	2,1914	3,8288	-0,8219	-2,4191	0,64
Israel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Romania	-0,1759	0,2247	2,0203	1,9504	2,4405	4,0878	-0,5023	-2,1043	0,38

- No data available

Variable Description:

DLRP1: Average difference between respondent and most close party on left-right scale.

DLRP2: Average difference between respondent and second most close party on left-right scale.

DLRPLA: Average difference between respondent and least close party on left-right scale.

ADLRP1: Average of absolute difference between respondent and most close party on left-right scale.

ADLRP2: Average of absolute difference between respondent and second most close party on left-right scale.

ADLRPLA: Average of absolute difference between respondent and least close party on left-right scale.

LRP1P2: Left-right difference between distance to most and second most close party.

LR1PL: Left-right difference between distance to most and least close party.

LR_Vote: Proportion of respondents voting for the party being closest to them on left-right scale.

Table A4: Slopes and Correlations between Effects (B's) and Macro Characteristics
(Macro Characteristics Standardized, Slopes comparable)

Slope and Significance in Aggregate Regression						
	%100- Ldisprop	%LDMag	%Ltrans +	% EffPar	% LR-Supply	% Supply +
Pvote						
- Pmax	0,0186	0,0214	0,023	0,128**	0,015	0,099*
- Kmax	-0,006	-0,009	-0,008	-0,080***	0,003	-0,049
- 10-ADLR	0,016	0,029*	0,0253	0,145***	0,0262	0,121**
Kvote						
- Pmax	0,011	0,012	0,013	0,047	0,041	0,072
- Kmax	-0,007	0,002	-0,004	0,009	0,047*	0,053
- 10-ADLR	0,012	0,028*	0,022	0,129**	0,022	0,106*
LR-Vote						
- Pmax	0,011	0,006	0,010	-0,037	0,012	-0,012
- Kmax	-0,007	0,004	-0,003	0,047	-0,014	0,008
- 10-ADLR	0,034*	0,031	0,038	0,147*	0,063	0,170**
Correlations						
	%100- Ldisprop	%LDMag	%Ltrans +	% EffPar	% LR-Supply	% Supply +
- Pvote						
- Pmax	0,378	0,351	0,380	0,636	0,149	0,480
- Kmax	-0,236	-0,272	-0,247	-0,709	0,057	-0,406
- 10-ADLR	0,373	0,497	0,429	0,744	0,242	0,609
Kvote						
- Pmax	0,265	0,251	0,278	0,298	0,388	0,444
- Kmax	-0,196	0,052	-0,081	0,062	0,497	0,342
- 10-ADLR	0,270	0,484	0,379	0,679	0,199	0,546
LR-Vote						
- Pmax	0,282	0,119	0,215	-0,243	0,119	-0,074
- Kmax	-0,240	0,124	-0,077	0,438	-0,190	0,075
- 10-ADLR	0,503	0,357	0,437	0,511	0,373	0,577