Profile Profile
Print
-A +A

Dr. Rustamdjan Hakimov

Portrait Dr. Rustamdjan Hakimov (Udo Borchert)
Research Fields
  • Experimental and Behavioral economics, Matching markets, Contests
Contact
fon: +49 30 25491 418
fax: +49 30 25491 442
mail: rustamdjan [dot] hakimov [at] wzb [dot] eu
Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785 Berlin
Research Fellow of the Research Unit
CV

 

since June 2016
Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Market Behavior research unit, WZB

2010-2016
Research Fellow in the Market Behavior research unit, WZB

2012-2016
Research Fellow of the bridging project
Cultural Framing Effects in Experimental Game Theory, WZB

2010-2016
Berlin Doctoral Program in Management and Economics. HU, TU, FU, ESMT, WZB, and DIW.
Courses (90 CET) fully completed in 2012.
Ph. D from Technical University Berlin, May 2016.

2008-2010
Master of Science degree in Economics and Management Science
Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany

2002-2007
Diploma in Mathematical Methods and Operations Research in Economics, Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan


Selected Publications

Not quite the best response: Truth-telling, strategy-proof matching, and the manipulation of others. 
With Pablo Guillen
Experimental Economics 20(3), 670-686, 2017. (Paper was previously circulated with the title: Monkey see, monkey do: Truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of the others.) Online Supplementary Material.

The willingness to pay-willingness to accept gap: A failed replication of Plott and Zeiler
With Dietmar Fehr and Dorothea Kübler
European Economic Review 78, 120128, 2015

Common components of risk and uncertainty attitudes across contexts and domains: Evidence from 30 countries
With Ferdinand M. Vieider, Mathieu Lefebvre, Ranoua Bouchouicha, Thorsten Chmura, Michal Krawczyk, Peter Martinsson
Journal of the European Economic Association 13(3), 421452, 2015

Working papers:

Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: Experimental evidence
With Inacio Bó
Revise and resubmit in The Economic Journal

Iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
With Inacio Bó

Self-confidence and unraveling in matching markets
With Marie-Pierre Dargnies and Dorothea Kübler
Reject and resubmit in Management Science

Contests in the workplace: With and without prize selection. Testing theory in a field experiment

How to get truthful reporting in matching markets: A field experiment
With Pablo Guillen
New version, 2015 (The paper was previously circulated under the title: Less is more)
Revise and resubmit in European Economic Review

Equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
With Onur Kesten
Revise and resubmit in International Economic Review
 

College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
With Isa Hafalir, Morimitsu Kurino, and Dorothea Kübler
Revise and resubmit in Journal of Economic Theory
 

Projects

On-line booking systems: Appointments for visa at German consulates
With C-Philipp Heller, Morimitsu Kurino and Dorothea Kübler

Best of both worlds: A two-stage matching mechanism for school choice
With Justin Mattias Valasek

Making truthful reporting easy: The behavioral help for mechanism design
With Alexander Nesterov