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Dr. Rustamdjan Hakimov

Portrait Dr. Rustamdjan Hakimov (Udo Borchert)
Research Fields
  • Experimental and Behavioral economics, Matching markets, Contests
Contact
fon: +49 30 25491 418
fax: +49 30 25491 442
mail: rustamdjan [dot] hakimov [at] wzb [dot] eu
Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785 Berlin
Research Fellow of the Research Unit
CV

 

since June 2016
Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Market Behavior research unit, WZB

2010-2016
Research Fellow in the Market Behavior research unit, WZB

2012-2016
Research Fellow of the bridging project
Cultural Framing Effects in Experimental Game Theory, WZB

2010-2016
Berlin Doctoral Program in Management and Economics. HU, TU, FU, ESMT, WZB, and DIW.
Courses (90 CET) fully completed in 2012.
Ph. D from Technical University Berlin, May 2016.

2008-2010
Master of Science degree in Economics and Management Science
Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany

2002-2007
Diploma in Mathematical Methods and Operations Research in Economics, Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan


Selected Publications

The effectiveness of top-down advice in strategy-proof mechanisms: A field experiment
With Pablo Guillen
European Economic Review, forthcoming

Not quite the best response: Truth-telling, strategy-proof matching, and the manipulation of others 
With Pablo Guillen
Experimental Economics 20(3), 670-686, 2017. (Paper was previously circulated with the title: Monkey see, monkey do: Truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of the others.) Online Supplementary Material.

The willingness to pay-willingness to accept gap: A failed replication of Plott and Zeiler
With Dietmar Fehr and Dorothea Kübler
European Economic Review 78, 120128, 2015

Common components of risk and uncertainty attitudes across contexts and domains: Evidence from 30 countries
With Ferdinand M. Vieider, Mathieu Lefebvre, Ranoua Bouchouicha, Thorsten Chmura, Michal Krawczyk, Peter Martinsson
Journal of the European Economic Association 13(3), 421452, 2015

Working papers:

Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: Experimental evidence
With Inacio Bó
Revise and resubmit at The Economic Journal

Iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
With Inacio Bó

Self-confidence and unraveling in matching markets
With Marie-Pierre Dargnies and Dorothea Kübler
Revise and resubmit at Management Science

Contests in the workplace with and without prize selection. Testing theory in a field experiment

Equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
With Onur Kesten
Revise and resubmit at International Economic Review

College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
With Isa Hafalir, Morimitsu Kurino, and Dorothea Kübler
Revise and resubmit at Journal of Economic Theory
 

 
Projects

On-line booking systems: Appointments for visa at German consulates
With C-Philipp Heller, Morimitsu Kurino and Dorothea Kübler

Best of both worlds: A two-stage matching mechanism for school choice
With Justin Mattias Valasek

Making truthful reporting easy: The behavioral help for mechanism design
With Alexander Nesterov