Negotiation under the curse of knowledge
An individual is affected by the curse of knowledge when he fails to appreciate the viewpoint of a lesser-informed agent. In contrast to a rational person, the cursed individual behaves as if part of his private information were common knowledge. This systematic cognitive bias alters many predictions derived from game theory which involve an asymmetry of information between the players.
What point of a distribution summarizes point predictions?
In this article, we study the point predictions that forecasters report when they are asked to predict the realization of an iid random variable. We set up a laboratory experiment where the participants act as forecasters predicting the next realization of random draws coming from different “objectively known” distributions which vary in the location of their central tendencies.
Comparison of different question formats eliciting point predictions
Survey questions that elicit point predictions regarding uncertain events face an important challenge as human forecasters use various statistics to summarize their subjective expectations. In this paper, we take up the challenge and study whether alternative formulations of the questions used to elicit point predictions can be successful in driving forecasters towards reporting a particular central tendency (median or mean) of their subjective expectations distribution.