INTRODUCTION

The literatures on interdependence in the 1970s and more recently on globalization reveal remarkable similarities, of which two are especially striking. The first is that the interest in both interdependence and globalization can be seen as an expression of a "poorly understood but widespread feeling that the very nature of world politics is changing" (Keohane and Nye, Jr., 2000: 104). The second is that both concepts never reached the status of a sound theory of world politics. While most users of these concepts realize that they challenge conventional theories of world politics and in a sense created new research agendas in International Relations, endeavors to formulate an interdependence or globalization theory of international relations have so far not succeeded.

Not least because of these commonalities, the more recent literature on globalization is confronted with questions such as "What's New?". In this contribution, I want to emphasize two differences between interdependence and globalization research. On the one hand, the notion of globalization differs from that of interdependence in that it refers to qualitatively different conditions. Whereas the notion of interdependence refers to a growing sensitivity and vulnerability between separate units, globalization refers to the merging of units (Section 2). This also affects the causal mechanisms which lead to political change (Section 3). Therefore, a reassessment of those propositions about political effects made by both interdependence and globalization literature is called for (Section 4).

On the other hand, to the extent that the notion of globalization refers to much more than just interdependence between distinct units, the propositions about change in world politics go much further in the current debate on global governance (Section 5). They indicate the need for a theory of world politics that re-evaluates the notion of distinct territorial units – be they ontologically given as in Realism or socially constructed as in Constructivism – as theoretical buildings blocks (Section 6).
THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: DIFFERENT FORMS OF INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND SOCIAL SPACES

Interdependence

Dependence, in its most general form, can be described as a situation in which a system is contingent upon external forces. Interdependence in the social sciences describes a situation of mutual dependence between social actors. Thus defined, interdependence relates to specific kinds of actions in specific issue-areas (see Morse, 1976: 118). Based on the distinction between the types of social actors that figure as external forces, interdependence in international relations can be due to two factors. On the one hand, nation states and national societies are dependent upon the activities of other states (state interdependence). In this sense, states have been dependent upon each other at least since the Westphalian system of states emerged (Bull, 1977). National security has always been dependent upon the decisions of governments in neighboring states – for instance, whether or not to wage war. On the other hand, the effects of given actions by a government may depend on societal developments that take place outside of its jurisdiction (societal interdependence). For instance, the development of national economies cannot be understood without taking into account what happens elsewhere. Social interconnectedness can lead to quite different forms of societal interdependence. While there are countless distinctions made in the literature (see, e.g., Baldwin, 1980; Caporaso, 1978; Senghaas, 1994; De Wilde, 1991), the most consequential distinction is the one between “sensitivity interdependence”, defined in terms of mutual effects, and “vulnerability interdependence”, defined in terms of the opportunity costs of disrupting the relationship (Keohane and Nye, Jr., 1977: 12-15).

Globalization and societal denationalization

Globalization goes further than interdependence. Richard Cooper (1986: 1) argues that “the internationalized economy of the 1960s was characterized by a sensitivity of economic transactions between two or more nations to economic developments within those nations”. By contrast, the process of economic globalization describes a movement towards one integrated world market in which “buyers and sellers are in such free intercourse with one another that the prices of the same goods tend to equality easily and quickly” (Cooper, 1986: 71). This distinction between an internationalized economy and the global integration of markets can be taken pars pro toto. When generalized to all societal relations, it points to the most important difference between interdependence and globalization. Globalization thus describes a process in which the world moves toward an integrated global society and the significance of national borders decreases. It thus calls into question the distinction between domestic and foreign relations. In this view, the living conditions of people and local communities have changed through globalization; distant events of all sorts have immediate consequences not only for states but for individuals’ daily lives (Rosenau, 1990: 78; Holm and Sørensen, 1995: 4–5; Hirst and Thompson, 1996: 7; Held et al., 1999: ch. 1). This notion of globalization refers to a measurable process of social change which, in turn, may or may not have causal effects on political developments. Globalization is thus neither identical with nor does it necessarily lead to the extension of political space and global governance. Nor does it necessitate the formation of a world society or transnational identities.

As opposed to globalization, the term “interdependence” refers to a condition. In this context, it is helpful to contrast the terms “interdependence” and “globalism” (Keohane and Nye, Jr., 2000: 104). The data however
does not justify the use of the term globalism. Globalism may only be appropriate to sketch some exceptional cases such as the financial markets and some global dangers, but it is inappropriate for most other fields. Moreover, in some areas a process toward globalism, that is, globalization as a process leading to global societal spaces, does not seem to be taking place at all. Most importantly, regionalization under the umbrella of American dominance is a process running in parallel to globalization (Katzenstein, 2005). Generally speaking, the context of globalization has fostered regionalization mainly as a result of new regional agreements such as the European Single Market, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the establishment of the ASEAN charter (Mansfield and Milner, 1997).

Against this background, the term “societal denationalization” (Habermas, 1998; Sassen, 1998; Zürn, 1995) seems to be more appropriate. The question is then whether intensified transboundary societal interactions at an already relatively high level signify a further decline in the importance of nationally defined borders. The condition of a society can be described as denationalized when transactions within national borders are no denser than transnational transactions. The term societal denationalization – as a process – thus has the advantage that it defines a starting point (national society) of the process but leaves the end point indeterminate. Moreover, if cases can be singled out that show a clear trend toward globalization, there is no problem in interpreting them as special instances of a more general trend toward societal denationalization. Seen thus, the transboundary pollution of the Rhine is just as much a phenomenon of societal denationalization as global warming, although only the latter is genuinely global.

**Measurement**

The interconnectedness of societies can be measured by the rise of transboundary transactions relative to transactions that take place within a national territory (see Deutsch and Eckstein, 1961; Rosecrance and Stein, 1973; Rosecrance et al., 1977; Katzenstein, 1975; Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Garrett, 1998b; Reinicke, 1998; Beisheim et al., 1999; Held et al., 1999). In the words of K.W. Deutsch (1969: 99), borders of national societies dissolve when there is no more critical reduction in the frequency of social transactions. The objection raised now and again by economists to this approach to measurement is that by observing these transactions, little can be said about real interdependence or, for that matter, globalization. For instance, changes in flow values may be due to market volatility, that is, changes in the attractiveness of economic locations, and perfectly integrated spaces may even be characterized by lower flow values (see Garrett, 1998a: ch. 3). For this reason, economists often propose the analysis of transaction costs and convergent prices, which they claim more closely approximate the theoretical conception of integrated spaces (Frankel, 1993; Garrett, 1998a). For instance, average prices for air travel with American airlines dropped from around 45 cents in 1929, to about 14 cents in 1960 to about 4 cents per mile in 2009 (http://www.airlines.org/economics/finance/PAPricesYield.htm); international telecommunication costs have sunk by about 8% per year since the late 1960s (Zacher with Sutton, 1996: 129).

Nevertheless, direct measurement of transactions is necessary in order to determine the level of globalization from a political science point of view. First, it is by no means certain that low transaction costs are a more reliable indication of integrated social spaces than the intensification of transactions. A reduction in the price of international phone calls, for instance, tells us much less about transboundary communication than an actual increase in phone calls. It is not the technical facilitation of communication, but communication itself that constitutes the relevant social action. Second, the argument that
perfectly integrated spaces do not necessarily show evidence of increased transactions is theoretically correct, yet of little practical significance. There are in effect no perfect, totally stable markets, but only approximations. Real-world approximations such as national markets are indeed characterized by extremely high transaction flows. Furthermore, if transaction flows are monitored over longer periods, temporary volatilities should be negligible as random noise created by periodic political events and spasmodic competitive shifts. Third, the measurement of transaction costs is technically very problematic, especially if specific national differences are taken into consideration. As a result, when it comes to operationalization, researchers who for theoretical reasons opt for measuring transaction costs ultimately have to resort to measuring the transactions themselves. As Keohane and Milner (1996: 4), for example, put it: “An exogenous reduction in the costs of international transactions (...) can be empirically measured by the growth in the proportion of international economic flows relative to domestic ones.”

Against this background, empirical studies on levels of interdependence and globalization can be summarized as follows (see also http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/, and Baldwin, 2006).

- Early propositions about decreasing interdependence among highly industrialized countries (Deutsch and Eckstein, 1961) and between great powers (Waltz, 1979) proved, at least in their generalized versions, to be wrong. While it is correct that levels of economic interdependence were lower in the 1950s and 1960s than in the decades prior to 1929, economic interdependence grew again in the industrialized world in the decades after World War II (Katzenstein, 1975; Rosecrance and Stein, 1973; Rosecrance et al., 1977).
- The latter part of the 1980s and most of the 1990s brought a sharp increase transborder transactions (any activity of social actors reaching beyond national boundaries) in many areas such as trade, foreign direct investments and other capital flows, but also human mobility, the volume of transborder information and communication, and the exchange of cultural products (Beisheim et al., 1999: 39–320). This surge led to the use of the term globalization. In most areas, the level of interconnectedness today clearly surpasses the levels of 1914.
- Many social transactions today transcend national borders, but neither are they global nor can a general tendency toward globality be observed. Rather, boundaries of new social spaces are becoming visible at the periphery of the OECD world. This is particularly evident in the economic sphere. Transborder trade primarily takes place within the three large trade blocks of the EU/EFTA, NAFTA, and ASEAN. This is followed by trade between the large trade blocks, with only a small share finally left for the rest of the world. Communication flows indicate a similar concentration on a relatively small number of countries (see, e.g., http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm).
- Substantial cross-national differences in market integration remain even in the OECD-world (see Garrett, 1999b). The levels of market integration are significantly higher in smaller countries than in larger ones. Moreover, a comparison of larger economies (G7), which takes into account more than just economic indicators, reveals that the integration of the British and American society into world society is higher for most indicators than in other G8 countries (see, e.g., http://www.atkearney.com/index.php/Publications/globalization-index.html).
- The level of globalization varies also significantly between different fields and issues. While the proportion of transborder postal deliveries, cross-border phone calls, and foreign direct investments, to name but a few indicators, is still below 10% in all G7 countries, the share of foreign trade, foreign air travel, foreign e-mails, and the consumption of foreign culture is often above 50% (Beisheim et al., 1999: 39–320).
- A new development is the common transboundary production of goods and services (as opposed to transboundary exchange of goods), which took off in the mid-1980s. The Internet, international crime, global climate change, and other global environmental dangers as well as the global financial markets can be seen as such phenomena. In these cases, transborder exchanges become so dense and in effect produce a new quality in the global space, so that references
to de-territorialization or even de-borderization (Agnew and Duncan, 1989; Harvey, 1989; Brock and Albert, 1995; Appadurai, 1996; Albert, 1996) are most pertinent.

WHAT DO INTERDEPENDENCE AND GLOBALIZATION EXPLAIN?

Having described the changes in the independent variables and the discussion of the causal mechanisms, the question now arises which effects really take place. In this section, I shall discuss two hypothesized effects (dependent variables) that are ascribed to both growing interdependence and globalization (as independent variables).

Peace and cooperation

The promise of early interdependence theorists was nothing less than “peace.” Sir Norman Angell (1969) and Ramsey Muir (1932) emphasized the reduction of difference and the convergence of interests as mechanisms through which rising interdependence would directly, though unintentionally, change world politics (see De Wilde, 1991). Czempiel (1986) elegantly framed this kind of thinking in terms of “peace through trade” as one of the three most important peace strategies at hand. Empirical studies have shown, however, that the pacifying effects of trade depend on the symmetry and the extent of the ensuing interdependence and other factors (Barbieri, 1996; Dorussen, 1999; Polachek et al., 1999; Reuveny and Kang, 1998; Gartzke, 2007; see also Chapter 23 by Jack Levy and Chapter 29 by Helen Milner in this volume).

The role of international institutions has been enhanced over the past three decades more or less in parallel to the rise of interdependence. While the number of international organizations, which is only a very rough measure of the development of international governance, has remained more or less constant since the 1990s (see Shanks et al., 1996; Pevehouse et al., 2004), the number of UN-registered international agreements grew from a total of 8,776 treaties in 1960 to 63,419 as of March 25, 2010. If we consider only the most important multilateral agreements officially drawn up and countersigned in the UN, then we obtain a comparable level of growth, namely, from 484 such agreements in 1969 to 1873 in 2010. The increase in international agreements is accompanied by a growing intensity of transgovernmental relations (Slaughter, 1997). The rise of international agreements and more intense transgovernmental relations are the components of a second strategy for peace emphasized by interdependence theorists: “peace through international organization.”

The current globalization literature is remarkably tacit on the issue of international peace and security. Relevant statements are mostly of a very general nature. By emphasizing the pressures that globalization puts on authoritarian states to foster liberalization, however, some writers – more implicitly than explicitly – have also connected globalization with the third peace strategy identified by Czempiel (1986): the ‘democratization’ of authoritarian societies (“peace through democracy”; see especially the literature on diffusion of Western norms, e.g., Simmons et al. 2006 and Chapter 18 by Gilardi in this volume). In this sense, globalization may be helpful in supporting three processes that are conducive to the absence of war between states. These are the direct effects of the reduction of difference (a diminished role for the armed forces) and convergence of interests (economic interests in maintaining relationships), that is, peace through trade; a liberalization of society brought about by the pressure to improve efficiency (peace through democracy); and the strengthening of international institutions as a political response (peace through international organization) (Russett and Oneal, 2001; see also Chapter 23 by Levy in this volume). The evolving patterns resemble what Karl Deutsch once described as the conditions and the processes leading to a pluralistic security community (Deutsch et al., 1957; Adler and Barnett, 1998).
The association of peace with globalization must be qualified for several reasons. First, it applies only to those areas in the world in which interconnectedness is highly prevalent and in which the effect of smaller differences is accompanied by the rise of international institutions and liberal societies. Second, only figures in the category of "interstate wars" have clearly declined, while intra-state or civil wars have been transformed (see also Chapter 26 by Walter in this volume). The number of intra-state conflicts has risen steadily since the beginning of the Cold War, coming to a peak in the mid-1990s. Since then, civil wars have also declined significantly (Human Security Centre, 2005; Chojnacki, 2006). While the rise of societal interdependence and new social spaces may indeed have reduced the capacity of the nation state to mobilize people for interstate wars, this does not imply a decline in general willingness to participate in instances of organized collective violence. Societal denationalization has also created new opportunities for organized collective violence. Most importantly, the rise of transnational economies of violence which keep civil wars alive (Pugh and Cooper, 2004; Le Billon and Nicholls, 2007), transnational terrorism (Enders and Sandler, 2006; Schneckener, 2006), and transnational networks of weapons proliferation (Corera, 2006) have created new opportunities and lead to the introduction of a new concept to understand collective violence in the age of globalization: "new wars" (Kaldor, 1999/2006). Partially as a response to new wars, a growing willingness of the international community most often authorized by the United Nations Security Council to intervene in such wars can be observed (Zangl and Zürn, 2003).

### Deregulation and convergence

The growing ineffectiveness of national policies was the major theme of Richard Cooper's (1968) contribution on the economics of interdependence. With the growing interdependence of national markets, so the argument goes, growing numbers of national policies no longer work. Empirical studies on the effect of economic interdependence, however, did not support this expectation. On the contrary, work on the national adaptation to external economic challenges demonstrated convincingly that domestic structures are decisive for an understanding of national political responses (see Cameron, 1978; Gourevitch, 1978; Katzenstein, 1978/1985). Quite contrary to the original hypothesis, this literature was instrumental in bringing the state back into (Anglo-Saxon) political science (Evans et al., 1985).

Nevertheless, Cooper's analysis has experienced a revival in the age of globalization. Most of the early literature on the effects of globalization took up the argument and diagnosed "the end of the social democratic era" (Scharpf, 1987), the "retreat of the state" (Strange, 1996), a "race to the bottom" as well as the "competition of the obsessed" (Krugman, 1995), a "competition state" (Hirsch, 1995), a "Schumpeterian workfare" state (Jessop, 1994), or a "residual state" (Cerny, 1996). Common to these early studies is the notion that efficiency pressures, congruence problems and, above all, problems of competitiveness induce a rapid deterioration in the effectiveness of national regulations. As a result, the state retreats and gives way to economic and social deregulation.

A number of prominent contributions claimed, however, that the often-feared race to the bottom did not materialize for several reasons. First, higher levels of economic openness increase the demand for policies to buffer the less desirable effects of world market integration. According to this compensation hypothesis, social policies and state interventions should be seen not only as cost-intensive burdens for efficient production, but also as a form of risk insurance in the face of increased economic openness (Garrett, 1998a; Rieger and Leibfried, 1997; Rodrik, 1997). Moreover, new growth theory suggested that many state interventions are...
economically efficient, even and especially in times of global competition (Krugman, 1994; Barro, 1996). In addition, it was argued that under certain circumstances, integrated markets may even trigger a race to the top (Vogel, 1995) and hence higher levels of economic interdependence and globalization may well lead to more rather than less state intervention. Finally, political scientists held that the way external challenges are politically mediated is still the single most important factor for understanding national policies. The mediation process is determined by a number of different, mainly institutional factors (Kitschelt et al., 1999; Vogel, 1996; Weiss, 1998). Therefore, different varieties of capitalism may choose different strategies of adoption and in this even lead to a further divergence of regulation (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The evidence produced in these first waves of studies clearly demonstrated that prominent convergence or deregulation trends did not exist in the 1990s. The level of state expenditures did not go down in parallel to the rise of economic interdependence and globalization, nor could clear convergence processes be observed (see Bernauer, 2000 for an excellent overview).

These findings have, however, also been subject to criticism, and newer studies cast doubt on these early conclusions for a number of reasons. First, the 1990s studies looked at a relative short time period after the new thrust of globalization set in. More recent studies show that that state expenditures have indeed gone down to some extent (Busemeyer, 2009; Elkins et al., 2006; Höpner and Schäfer, 2007; but see also Bergh and Karlsson, 2010; Dreher et al., 2008). Second, it has been convincingly argued that looking at actual expenditure levels is a bad indicator. The more relevant indicator would be individual entitlements for social benefits. While, for instance, the level of unemployment expenditure did grow, the amount of money received by the individual beneficiaries dropped in almost all G7 countries (Pierson, 1996; Anderson and Pontusson, 2001). Moreover, the absence of convergence processes cannot be equated with an absence of constraints. Case studies on current political processes in many welfare states show that constraints imposed on social policies are strongly felt and translate into difficult compromises (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2000). For example, it can be shown that tax competition did not cause a decrease in tax revenue but led to important changes in the structure of national tax systems. In general, the tax burden was shifted from mobile to immobile businesses and from capital to labor and consumption (Genschel, 2002; Ganghof, 2006; Rixen and Rohlfing, 2007; Swank, 2006).

At the same time, some movements toward deregulation have been shown. Studies focusing on specific policy areas demonstrated a strong convergent trend toward deregulation. Deregulation in the postal and telecommunication services is a strong case in point. It thus seems necessary to focus much more on issue-area differences in order to understand the dynamics triggered by globalization (see Bernauer, 2000: ch. 8; Scharpf, 1999: ch. 3; Lee and Strang 2006; Höpner and Schäfer, 2007). Moreover, globalization has led to a general and significant increase of inequality within developed market economies. If the distribution of wealth is looked at from a global perspective, however, inequality did not increase (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2010; Bergh and Nilsson, 2008; Dreher and Gaston, 2006), largely due to the rise of income in China (Wade, 2004).

In sum, more recent studies on the effects of globalization have shown that a trend toward convergent deregulation has taken place to some extent, yet much less clear than originally expected and very much conditional on a number of scope conditions. Nevertheless, the competitive pressure on nation state policy can hardly be overlooked and shows some effects. Additional evidence in that respect is provided by studies that examine how societal denationalization affects political processes as opposed to political outcomes. Such an examination of "the politics of denationalization" looks at the changes of those political institutions and
struggles that produce national policies rather than at the policies itself (see Burgoon, 2009; Quinn and Toyoda, 2007; Zürn and Walter, 2005).

Research with a focus on peace and cooperation or on convergence and deregulation as functions of increasing societal denationalization – with the possible exception on the literature of new wars – never fundamentally challenged the theory of international relations. It essentially builds on given assumptions, for instance, that national societies are separable units and that state executives are agents who act rationally in the name of their principals. In this sense, they were never intended to culminate in a globalization theory (writ large) of world politics. They did, however, have a theoretical impact in that they constituted a serious challenge to Realism on a number of counts. Since the emergence of interdependence, research in international politics can no longer be reduced to the study of security and military issues, of peace and war. World politics today is much more than that. Moreover, interdependence research brought nonstate actors and, above all, international institutions to the fore.

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THE DEEPER EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION

There is hardly a modern political institution which is not allegedly challenged, transformed, or undermined by globalization. Globalization is not only said to be curbing the autonomy of nation states and enforcing a convergence of national policies, but also disabling democracy and with it the legitimacy of national political systems, altering the nature of sovereignty and thus ultimately transforming the fundamental structures of international politics from an anarchic to a global governance system (see Rosenau, 1997; Zürn, 1998; see also Chapter 10 by Biersteker in this volume). Global governance refers to the entirety of regulations put forward with reference to solving specific denationalized problems or providing transnational common goods. The entirety of regulations includes the processes by which norms, rules, and programs are monitored, enforced, and adapted, as well as the structures in which they work. Governance activities are justified with reference to the common good, but they do not necessarily serve it. Global governance points to those sets of regulation which address denationalized problems, that is, problems which reach beyond national borders.

This concept of global governance has two important implications. To begin with, by distinguishing governance structure from contents and actors, it becomes obvious that governance beyond the nation-state is possible, although a central authority or a ‘world state’ equipped with a legitimate monopoly of the use of force is currently lacking (Rosenau, 1992). Moreover, by requiring a common goods-oriented justification of norms and rules, the concept of global governance also refers to a certain quality of international regulation. Accordingly, international cooperation includes more than just simple coordination between states to achieve a modus vivendi of interaction. Rather, international regulation often aims actively at achieving normatively laden political goals in handling common problems of the international community. In this sense, governance presupposes some common interests and goal orientations beyond the nation-state, at least in a rudimentary form, without – of course – denying the persistence of fundamental conflicts.

In addition to the study of international cooperation, the analysis of global governance thus also raises issues such as transnational participation and transnational networks as well as the merging and interplay of political institutions that once were conceived as separable units (Keohane and Nye, Jr., 2000; see also Chapters by Adler, Snidal, Risse, and Simmons and Martin in this volume). In this contribution, I want to focus therefore on supra- and transnationalization of governance beyond the nation-state,
the emergence of global multi-level governance, and the ensuing transformation of statehood and its impact on the notion of democracy as well as critical responses to these developments. So far, none of these fields of debate and research have come up with conclusive results, but they do highlight interesting fields of research for the future.

Supranationalization, transnationalization, and decentralization

Supranational and transnational governance undermine the notion of a sovereign state in the so-called Westphalian constellation. Supranationalization describes a process in which international institutions develop procedures that contradict the consensus principle and the principle of nonintervention. In this way, some international norms and rules create obligations for national governments to take measures even when they have not agreed to do so. As a result, political authority shifts partially toward the international level (Kahler and Lake, 2009: 246; see also Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 5; Hurd, 2007; Rittberger et al., 2008: 3; Ruggie, 1998). International Institutions have authority when states recognize in principle or in practice, their ability to make [...] binding decisions on matters relating to a state’s domestic jurisdiction, even if those decisions are contrary to a state’s own policies and preferences.” (Cooper et al., 2008: 505).

Political authority beyond the nation-state does not necessarily require autonomous international organizations. Both, international institutions with an international organization that has been delegated autonomous power to make decisions (e.g., the International Criminal Court) and international institutions without such a formal delegation of power (e.g., majority decisions in the UN Security Council) can possess authority in the defined sense. In the former case, one can speak of delegated authority; the latter is a case of pooled authority (Moravcsik, 1998: 67; Hawkins et al., 2006). The authority of international institutions thus points to another feature than the autonomy of international organizations.

To the extent that societal denationalization increases, demands for strong international institutions on the level beyond the nation-state that are able to act even in the presence veto players grow as well. Moreover, to the extent that the density and scope of international governance grow, demands for supranationalization and transnationalization arise. As international governance covers more and more issue-areas, overlaps and collisions between the jurisdictions of international regulations and other international or national regulations become more likely. Supranational bodies are a logical response to avoid such collisions. Moreover, the more international regimes address behind-the-border issues (Kahler, 1995), which are especially difficult to monitor and have significant impacts on societal actors, the more the question of credibility arises. A logical way to increase the credibility of commitments is to develop supranational bodies that are able to decide even when complete consensus does not exist and that monitor regulations and resolve conflicts (see Zürn, 2004).

As a result, international institutions possess a new, authority-generating quality which shows at every stage of the policy cycle.

- First, an increase of majority decision making in international institutions can be observed. Today, roughly two-thirds of all international organizations with the participation of at least one great power have the possibility to decide by a majority of votes by states (see Blake and Payton, 2008). This implies that some member states in an international institution can be overruled. Even if decision by majority is employed far less often than it is formally available for use, it however exerts pressure on veto players and increases their readiness to seek compromise.
- Secondly, monitoring and verification of international rules are, likewise, increasingly carried out by actors who are not directly under the control of states. In this way, the growing need
for independent actors who process and make available information on treaty compliance is met. Such information could be provided by contracting organizations established as part of a treaty regime’s safeguard. Equally important in this regard is the growing significance of transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). For example, the monitoring of internationally standardized human rights has long been transferred informally to human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch (see Simmons, 2009 and the chapter by Risse in this volume). The proliferation of transnational NGOs accredited by the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council can thus be taken as an indicator for this development (see http://esango.un.org/paperless/content/E2009INF4.pdf).

Thirdly, regarding disputed cases of rule interpretation, we find that there has been a significant increase in international judicial bodies. In 1960, there were worldwide only 27 quasi-judicial bodies; by 2004, this number had grown to 97. If we narrow the definition and include only those bodies that meet all of the prerequisites for formal judicial proceedings, then only five such bodies existed worldwide in 1960, climbing to 28 by 2004 (see http://www.pict-pcti.org/matrix/matrixIntro.html; see also Alter, 2009). The rise of such bodies also indicates a broader process of legalization of international institutions (see Abbott et al., 2000; Zürn and Joerges, 2005 and the chapter by Simmons in this volume).

Concerning rule enforcement, we can observe an increased readiness to levy material sanctions against violators. Jus cogens (independent and binding international law, not requiring the consent of states) in the meantime reaches beyond the prohibition of wars of aggression and includes inter alia the prohibition of crimes against humanity, genocide, and apartheid. Furthermore, especially since 1989, the international community has begun to respond to cases of gross violation of human rights increasingly with military force and economic sanctions (Finnemore, 2003; Holzgreve and Keohane, 2003; Binder, 2009: 340). After 1989, in some cases (like Kosovo or East Timor) the United Nations even set up transitional administrations with far-reaching executive, legislative, and judicial powers (Caplan, 2004).

Finally, other actors have begun to compete with states in the field of policy evaluation and related agenda setting. The concept of epistemic communities refers to transnational expertise networks that shape international negotiations, especially in the area of environmental politics (see Haas, 1992 and the chapter by Mitchell in this volume). Moreover, the set of organizations that evaluate the effectiveness of existing regulations and place new problem areas on the international agenda has widened in accordance with the extent to which the addressees of international regulation have become societal actors (Haas and Stevens, 2009).

In addition, transnational institutions, which are able to partially escape the control of nation-states, have gained in importance. Transnationalization of governance refers to a process in which transnational nonstate actors develop political regulations and activities without being formally authorized by states (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2009; Pattberg, 2007; see Chapter 17 by Risse in this volume). Such regulations are based on the principle of self-governance and create private authority (vgl. Cutler et al., 1999; Biersteker and Hall, 2002).

Overall, a dense network of international and transnational institutions has developed in recent decades. Many of these institutions are far more intrusive than conventional international institutions. With the – most often consensual – decision to install international institutions, state parties become subject to a law other than their own, to which they either have not agreed upon (mission creep) or do not agree with any more (costly exit option). Given the extent of the intrusion of these new international institutions into the affairs of national societies, the notion of “delegated, and therefore controlled authority” in the principal-and-agent sense no longer holds. At least in some issue-areas, the global level has achieved a certain degree of authority and has thus partially replaced the consensus principle of the traditional international system.

In parallel to the rise of political authority beyond the nation-state, processes of decentralization, that is, the shifting of political authority to decentralized levels within the
nation-state, can be observed. It is no longer only the political actions of the nation-state that provoke regionalist responses, but also the undermining of some of its traditional functions through globalization and political internationalization. In an increasingly competitive world market, rich regions want to rid themselves of their national commitments, while at the same time the development of market-enhancing international institutions has reduced the risks of secession and even increased the incentives to organize regionally in order to be eligible for supranational resources. The evolving complexity of governance beyond the nation-state in turn creates desires to emphasize cultural differences at the regional level and to represent regional interests directly, no longer via the nation-state. Against this background, it does not come as a surprise that in parallel to the growing importance of international institutions, we see a clear and strong tendency towards decentralization within the nation-state (Hooghe and Marks, 2010). An index of regional authority in 42 democracies and semi-democracies reveals that 29 countries have regionalized, and only two have become more centralized since 1950 (Marks et al., 2008).

The new role of the state and multi-level governance

The rise of political authority beyond and below the nation-state should, however, by no means be read as an indication of the demise of the nation-state. First, the developments described here apply only to certain denationalized issue-areas. Secondly, it is hard to see how governance goals can be achieved without the nation-state even in strongly denationalized issue-areas. Thirdly, the nation-state remains with respect to many issues the first address for political demands, even in highly denationalized issue-areas. Whereas transnational NGOs and even traditional interest groups increasingly address international institutions directly with their political demands, the nation-state remains in this respect the default option. Nation-states still aggregate territorial interests and put them forward in international negotiations.

The concept of multi-level governance promises to better grasp the complex arrangements of governing institutions than the notion of sovereign states. In such a multi-level constellation, nation-states will not relinquish their resources such as monopoly on the use of force or the right to extract taxes in a given territory. Nevertheless, while the nation-state will play a significant role in multi-level governance, it will no longer be the paramount political institution being able to perform all functions, but only one among others carrying out some of these tasks (Leibfried and Zürn, 2005). The nation-state has lost its monopoly for political authority. At least fully consolidated states in the OECD world remain pivotal, however, playing increasingly the role of an authority manager (Genschel and Zangl, 2008) orchestrating global governance (Abbott/Snidal 2010).

Each of the levels constituting global governance thus exercises authority; that is, it can meet decisions and take measures in a given issue-area, which cannot be unilaterally reversed by other levels without violating accepted procedures. If, however, more than one level exhibits authority, there is a “need to coordinate decisions between different levels,” and one can speak of multi-level governance (Benz, 2004).

Global multi-level governance is different from both unitary federal political systems (Scharpf et al., 1976) and the European multi-level system (Marks et al., 1996; Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch, 1996). All these three types of multi-level governance systems are characterized by a two-staged implementation process. In all these cases, norms and rules developed by the higher level will be mostly implemented by decentralized units. The first important difference refers to legitimation processes. In a unitary federal system, there is a direct relationship between the societal addressees of a regulation and the central decision-making units.
The government and the parliament are directly accountable to the citizens. They are elected by the citizens and address them directly when justifying laws and measures. Here, we can speak of a direct, or one-staged, legitimation process. In the European multi-level system, the direct contacts between the central decision units and the citizens are limited. Whereas elections to the European parliament constitute a direct relationship, other – more important – decision units such as the Commission and the Council are as a collective not directly accountable. This is even less so when it comes to international institutions.

In addition, global multi-level governance differs with respect to the coordination of different policies. Since regulations always produce effects in other issue-areas than the one to which it is directed, governance also involves the coordination of different policies which have been formulated at the same level or at different levels. In unitary federalism, coordination takes place via formal procedures on the side of central decision makers, for instance, via cabinet rules or supreme courts, and through public debate on the side of the addressees of a regulation.

In this respect, the EU can be described as a multi-issue arrangement with a limited number of nonoverlapping jurisdictional boundaries and some built-in coordination mechanisms such as the Commission and the Council. Such a governance structure follows a system-wide architecture which is relatively stable and clearly public in character. Whereas broad public debate is possible, such debates occur most frequently at the constituent-member level and are therefore often fragmented. They nevertheless provide for some policy coordination as an expression of some minimal sense of a polity (Hooghe and Marks, 2010). By contrast, global multi-level governance describes a complex and fluid patchwork of overlapping jurisdictions. In these cases, each issue area has developed its own norms and rules, and the membership varies from issue-area to issue-area. Debates and discourses take place almost exclusively within sectoral publics which do not address the side effects of certain measures for other issue-areas. In addition, there are no constitutionalized mechanisms for the coordination of different issue-area-specific regimes; at best, informal mechanisms exist. Thus, global multi-level governance stands out by a very loose coupling of different issue areas (see Table 16.1):

### Structural problems of global Multi-level governance

These specific features of global multi-level governance point to their most important deficiencies which are discussed in the literature (see Zürn, 2010).

### Compliance

Global multi-level governance systems are permanently confronted with a significant likelihood of noncompliance (see Börzel et al., 2010; Downs et al., 1996). While many consider the legitimate monopoly on the use of force as a necessary prerequisite for compliance, the case of the European Union demonstrates that alternative mechanisms such as legitimacy, legalization, and nonhierarchical enforcement can be used to successfully induce a sufficient level of compliance.
GLOBALIZATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

(Tallberg, 2002; Zürn and Joerges, 2005). All of the alternatives mentioned for ensuring compliance depend, however, on specific scope conditions which are not regularly given on the global level. The appeal to legitimacy grounded in law-like procedures depends on the willingness of a noncompliant actor to be responsive to good reason and concerns of legitimacy. In cases of nonhierarchical enforcement mechanisms, the enforcing actors need to be willing to bear the costs of enforcement, and the addressees of sanctioning and blaming need to be vulnerable to such strategies. Obviously, these conditions do not always hold on the global level. While some of these mechanisms work under some conditions effectively on the global level as well (see Breitmeier et al., 2006; Chayes and Chayes, 1995; Simmons, 2009), global multi-level governance is inherently selective vis-à-vis the implementation of norms and rules.

Coordination

The lack of a central place for the coordination of different policies points to a further deficiency in the global multi-level governance system. Global Governance does not know a central government which is responsible for the coordination of different policies. Moreover, one of the major functions of a broad public – namely, to decide in cases of goal conflicts between different sectors such as growth and clean environment, or security and freedom – cannot be fulfilled by sectoral publics which, by definition, are tied exclusively to either growth, environmental protection, security, or freedom. In this sense, the fragmentation of international regulation constitutes a serious defect of global governance (Benvenisti and Downs, 2007).

Against this background, the global multi-level governance system has – again informally – produced some substitute institutions which sometimes seem to assume such a coordinating role. The UN Security Council in particular has aspired to such a role by deciding on all those issues in which the goal of peace and the protection of human rights seem to contradict each other. Also, the G 8/20 seem to define themselves as central coordinators by giving other international institutions a sense of direction and by taking up those pressing issues which are not sufficiently dealt with by existing international institutions. The rise of transnational and national dispute settlement bodies points as well to the lack of coordination in global multi-level governance. While such adulatory bodies still rarely mediate between different issue-areas – with the exception of the WTO-DSB – they play an important role in the coordination between the global and the national levels. The quantitative rise of such dispute settlement bodies indicates the growing autonomy of the global level, but also the lack of coordination between different sectors of the global level. All these attempts, however, have remained limited. Moreover, they generate resistance from many other actors, because membership in these institutions is not only restricted, but also highly exclusive. The members of these institutions are self-nominated in the role as coordinators and lack authorization to act in this function. Moreover, these institutions were in the first place not created for the purpose of coordination. They are probably the most emergent elements of an emergent order.

Legitimacy

In addition, global multi-level governance produces specific legitimation problems. As long as the intergovernmental level was restricted to merely developing a modus vivendi of interaction, requiring the consent of each member state, the two-staged process of legitimation was sufficient. The decisions taken at the level beyond the constituent members were legitimated through the legitimacy of their representatives. With the rise of a multi-level system and the authority of international institutions undermining the consensus principle, this has changed. There is an increasing need for direct accountability (Grant and Keohane, 2005).

There are two strands of thought among those who identify a democratic deficit in the
way international institutions work. One strand points to institutional deficits of international institutions that can be adjusted through reforms, provided there is the right political will. Another strand considers these suggestions as naïve and even questions the *mere possibility* of democratic processes beyond the nation-state because the EU and other international institutions cannot meet the social prerequisites for democracy. According to skeptics, democratic legitimacy is only possible within the framework of a political community with the potential for democratic self-governance as expressed in the concept of the modern nation (Kielmansegg, 1976; Miller, 1995). Beyond the nation-state, the social prerequisites for a democratic political community – the political space – is missing. Hence, the connection between nation and democracy is not a historical coincidence but systematic and indissoluble. A political community as exemplified in the modern nation-state requires some degree of homogeneity, and without it there can be no democracy (Scharpf, 1998; Greven, 2000).

To the extent that for pragmatic reasons skeptics accept the need for decisions through international institutions, globalization leads to the uncomfortable choice between “effective problem-solving through international institutions” or “democratic political processes” (Dahl, 1994). This is, however, not a particularly convincing theoretical perspective (Zürn, 2000). In democratic terms, international institutions are a sensible response to the problems facing democracy in times of societal denationalization, as they help to secure some of the constitutional prerequisites of democracy (Keohane et al., 2009) and redress the incongruence between social and political spaces (Held, 1995). For the purposes of democracy, spatial congruence is necessary at two critical points. First, congruence between the people who are affected by a decision and their representatives in the decision-making system (input congruence) is required. If there is no *input congruence*, then a group affected by a decision but not participating in its making can be considered to have had the decision imposed on it by others. Congruence between the space for which regulations are valid and the boundaries of the relevant social transactions – that is, *output incongruence* – is also significant for democratic legitimacy. In a denationalized world ruled by a system of formally independent nation-states, there is a danger that political communities will not reach a desired goal due to conditions outside their jurisdiction. The “emergence of denationalized governance structures” (Joerges, 1996) helps to bring all those who are affected by a political decision into the decision-making system, thus observing the principle of “no taxation without representation.” What is more, international institutions help to increase the factual freedom of political communities. Governance beyond the nation-state can therefore improve both social welfare and democracy in the face of societal denationalization. In this sense, international institutions are not the problem, but part of the solution to the problems of modern democracy.

The rising number and importance of transnational NGOs – that is, societal groups influencing international decisions directly by arguing mainly in terms of the global common good (as opposed to member interests) – can be seen as an institutional response to the deficits of the two-staged legitimation process. NGOs are an important element of sectoral publics, which help to connect the global level of regulation directly with the societal addressees of the regulations. In this way, the two-staged legitimation process gets informally complemented with a direct link (see Chapter 17 by Risse in this volume).

*Politization and fragmentation*

These three deficiencies of global multi-level governance are reflected in an increased politicization of international institutions. The growing need to legitimate international affairs is evidenced by the unwillingness of national publics, parliaments, and transnational civil society to accept without further ado the important outcomes of major international
negotiations as urgently necessary achievements of international cooperation. The outcome of international negotiations is no longer greeted merely because a result has been attained. The procedures for obtaining results in international political processes and their content, and above all the concomitant subsystemic assignment of powers, require justification. It is called for by numerous, so-called antiglobalization groups such as Attac and other social movements acting in the transnational sphere (see della Porta and Tarrow, 2005; della Porta and Caiani, 2009; Rucht, 2004; Tarrow, 2001).

Resistance against international authority organized at the national level against the undermining of democratic sovereignty became more visible as well in the last decades. A good case in point are the referendums on European integration and a growing skepticism against European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2004). More generally, an ominous factor accompanying the decline of public confidence in traditional political authority in many OECD countries is a resurgence of right-wing extremism. In a similar vein, anti-modernist movements have gained strength in parallel to globalization outside of the OECD world, too.

However, such activities are not alone in focusing attention on international institutions and treaties. Only part of the current discussion on international institutions is concerned with opposition. Many transnational NGOs and social movements are calling for stronger international and transnational organizations to satisfy the need for regulation. For example, many environmental groups advocate a central world environmental organization and the drastic intensification of climate policy measures at the international level, or the strengthening of international development policy. Many societal groupings hence demand stronger international institutions. This double movement of growing protest against international institutions and their more intensive utilization can be described as politicization, that is, making previously unpolitical matters political.

The extent of this politicization today is considerable. The increasing politicization of international institutions is apparent in both individual attitudes (e.g. Mau, 2007; Ecker-Ehrhardt and Wessels, 2010) and in the behavior of societal and political actors (e.g. Rucht, 2010; Gronau et al., 2009; Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Grande and Kriesi, 2010). Although the political debate on cross-border problems and the mandate and decisions of international institutions is not omnipresent, it is becoming increasingly broad. Politicizers range from local action groups and a multiplicity of civil society organizations, companies, associations, and parties to governments. They politicize in the media, in the street, and in the forums of political institutions themselves.

This level of politicization can be explained by the deficiencies of global multi-level governance (see also Cox, 1997; Habermas, 2007). On the one hand, there is a growing demand for legitimation of international institutions exercising authority. The politicization of international institutions arises here as a consequence of their political authority and the ensuing need for legitimation (see Zürn et al., 2007). In the course of this track of politicization, oriented to begin with on the material policy itself, the thrust of the process often changes direction: decision-making procedures and the institutional setting as such become the focus of criticism. What is criticized is the lacking representativeness, transparency, and accountability of decision-making processes and bodies in international institutions – the lack of legitimation on the “input side” (cf. Ecker-Ehrhardt and Wessels, 2010; Scharpf, 1997). Greater public access is accordingly demanded, especially for NGOs and direct stakeholders. The shift of decision-making powers to international institutions as a whole called into question (cf. also della Porta and Caiani, 2009).

On the other hand, politicization can emerge as a consequence of the perceived need for regulation. Numerous economic, social, and cultural problems have meanwhile been
Societal denationalization over the past two or three decades has led to a rise in international institutions that in effect may change the constitution of world politics. The shape of more recent inter-, trans-, and supranational institutions is hardly compatible with the traditional notion of state sovereignty in the national constellation. Governments and other political organizations do not merely sit back and watch globalization and the decline in the effectiveness of unilateral policies. As a result, global governance has emerged, leading to both political mobilization beyond the nation-state and resistance to it. The national constellation, that is the convergence of resources, recognition, and the realization of governance goals in one political organization – the nation state – seems thus to be in a process of transformation into a post-national constellation (Zürn and Leibfried, 2005). The nation-state is no longer the only site of authority, political contestation, and the normativity that accompanies it.

Globalization and global governance studies, however, so far hardly constitute a theory of world politics. In many ways, both these literatures speculate and hypothesize about the political effects of increasing societal interconnectedness using already existing theories. In a very subtle sense, though, this research has structured the theoretical debate in IR over the last three decades. Waltz’ (1979) theory of international politics and other Realist writings can be seen as a deliberate attempt to rescue IR as an independent discipline from the logic of interdependence. In Realist thinking, it was possible not only to understand IR without taking domestic politics and international institutions into consideration and, moreover, the notion was reconfirmed that national societies and their respective states can be conceptualized as utterly separate entities. Thus, the interaction of those entities was declared a field of the discipline of International Relations. This reconfirmation put interdependence writers in the defensive. Their counterattack was directed at a different target: to show that nation states have good reasons to establish international institutions. In this way, they indirectly reconfirmed the strict notions of distinctly separate national societies and traditional notions of sovereignty. In a sense, the debate as a whole accepted the analytical shackles of “methodological nationalism”;
The study of global governance needs to go beyond methodological nationalism.

Methodological nationalism considers nation-states as the basic unit of all politics. It assumes that humankind is naturally distributed among a limited number of nations, which organize themselves internally as nation-states and delimit themselves externally from other nation-states (see Smith, 1979; Beck, 2000). In addition, it assumes that the external delimitation and the subsequent competition between nation-states are the most fundamental concepts of political organization. Methodological nationalism is distinct from normative nationalism, according to which each nation has the inalienable right to organize itself in its own, culturally specific way. Methodological nationalism sees national self-determination as ontologically given and as the most important cleavage in the political sphere. This double premise predetermines empirical observations, as can be seen, for example, in the case of aggregate statistics, which are almost exclusively categorized in national terms. It locates and restricts the political sphere to the national level.

Governance beyond the nation-state extends the realm of the political beyond national borders and sovereign states. We must therefore develop a notion of a global polity which cannot only be seen as substitutive to nation-states at a higher level. All forms of governance beyond the nation-state currently lack a central authority or a “world state” equipped with a legitimate monopoly of the use of force. In the absence of a world state or an empire with global reach, governance beyond the nation-state cannot take the form of governance by government; rather, it needs to be a form of governance with governments such as we see in international institutions, or governance without governments8 as in transnational institutions, or in supranational governance. The interplay of different forms of governance beyond the nation-state produces polities of a new quality. Such conceptualizations do not need to rely on utopian thinking about a world state or world federalism. It seems more promising to recall the tradition of historical macrosociology upheld by Stein Rokkan, Charles Tilly, and others. As early as the 1960s and 1970s, they aimed at overcoming the dominant approach of treating nation-states as logically independent cases. Instead, they advocated a more complete map of one interdependent system (Tilly, 1984: 129).

In this contribution, it has been argued that the recent research on globalization and global governance shows that a transformation of world politics takes place requiring research approaches that move beyond methodological nationalism. The outcome of this transformation, however, is open, and it is certainly not possible to predict it by just extrapolating some of the trends discussed above. Most international institutions were created by Western powers, sometimes before developing countries had emerged from colonialism. These institutions will have to respond to the rise of new powers that have a claim for greater influence based both on distributive and legitimacy grounds. Moreover, some of these new powers have traditions of political authority and legitimation different from the experience of the established democratic states. They also emphasize different justifications for political authority at an international level (see Zürn and Stephen, 2010).

The ensuing emphasis on the principle of nonintervention by almost all new powers (and the United States) thus seems to be a huge obstacle for further strengthening international institutions and making global governance more effective. A closer look, however, reveals significant ambiguities. One the one hand, most newly emerging powers, sometimes including China, often demand more international regulation and stronger international institutions as, for instance, indicated by the positions taken with respect to the economic and financial crisis in the G20 negotiations. The emerging powers seem not to aim at overhauling the existing international institutions, rather they want to be co-opted and to reform them from the inside.
On the other hand, there is an ongoing suspicion that stronger international institutions are instruments of Western dominance and help to prolong an unequal distribution of benefits. This tension explains the widespread emphasis on broader and more equal state participation as a prerequisite for stronger international institutions. The demand for more societal participation therefore does not rank as the newly emerging powers' highest priority. Such demands stem from (mainly Western) NGOs and thus will play out to some extent independent of the relations between new and old state powers. The double demand of newly emerging powers for more equal state participation and NGOs for more societal involvement in international decision making may be the driving forces in the development of global governance in the next decades. Political authority beyond the nation-state as any political authority requires legitimacy to be effective. In any case, these struggles about the shape of international authority will focus increasingly on legitimacy of international and transnational institutions as a bone of contention. It will need a new International Relations theory moving beyond methodological nationalism to understand these processes.

NOTES

1 I want to thank the editors of the handbook as well as Martin Binder, Monika Heupel, and Thomas Rixen for their helpful comments.

2 This, of course, depends on the notion of world society. I use a definition that requires more than just transactions. For major contributions to the question of world society see Luhmann (1971), the contributions to Beck (1998) and Albert et al. (2000).

3 Thus, globalization is not defined here as an all-encompassing process of epochal proportions. According to this latter understanding, globalization not only implies a growth in transnational interactions, but also comprises political processes and "the stretching and deepening of social relations and institutions across space and time" (see e.g. Giddens, 1990; Held and McGrew, 1993: 263; Held, 1995: 20; Elkins, 1995; Rosenau, 1997). Globalization thus understood denotes all (individual as well as the sum total of) globally oriented practices and patterns of thought as well as the epochal transformation which is constituted by them (Albrow, 1996: 89). These general notions of de-territorialization underestimate the extent to which politics is spatially bound. Politics tends to be more particularistic than, for example, economics, since, as Michael Walzer (1983: 50) writes, "communities must have boundaries".

4 The denationalized condition is still rare. Helliwell (1998) demonstrates that even between the US and Canada, the national border still has an impact on reducing trade between cities and provinces in North America.

5 In the remainder I use the terms globalization and societal denationalization interchangeably. The term denationalization goes back to the classic works of Karl W. Deutsch (1969) and Eric Hobsbawm (1992) on nationalism, according to which a nation is a political community for which dense societal transactions within the national territory and a sharp reduction in the frequency of social transactions at the borders are constitutive components. In this view, a nation stands in a mutually constitutive relationship to the nation state. Consequently, societal denationalization is an indication of the weakening link between "nation states and [their] corresponding national societies" (Beck, 1997: 44).

6 See also Haftel and Thompson (2008), who define the independence of international organizations as the absence of complete control by other actors and consider autonomy, together with neutrality and delegation of authority, as constitutive elements

7 Arguably, the arrangement is – given the parallel process of supranationalization and transnationalization – better described as multi-level and multi-actor governance, since on each of the levels, different actors – public ones and privates ones – independent of each other are relevant. In this contribution, the conceptual focus is on the interplay of different levels (each of them consisting of more than one actor) which makes it possible to use the simpler, yet still not very elegant term multi-level governance.

8 The meaning of this term differs from Rosenau (1992: 5) governance without government, which refers to all politics without a central authority.

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