

Preliminary Program of the Conference on

**Matching Market Design:  
Strategy-Proofness and Beyond**

**July 13–14, 2023**

Hosted and organized by the WZB Berlin Social Science Center

The conference is supported by grants from the  
CRC TRR 190, BSE Insights, and the BCCP


Organizers:

**Christian Basteck**

**Dorothea Kübler**

**Vincent Meisner (TU)**

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)



**Thursday, July 13, 2023**

9.00–9.30      **Registration**  
Workshop Opening

9.30–10.40      **1<sup>st</sup> Session:      Chair: tba**

**Alex Rees-Jones** (University of Pennsylvania)

[Behavioral Economics in Education Market Design: A Forward-Looking Review](#)

**Camille Terrier** (Queen Mary University of London):

[From Immediate Acceptance to Deferred Acceptance: Effects on School Admissions and Achievement in England](#)

10.40–11.45      Coffee Break

11.05–12.15      **2<sup>nd</sup> Session      Chair: tba**

**Markus Möller** (University of Bonn):

[Transparent Matching Mechanisms](#)

**Yannai Gonczarowski** (Harvard University):

[Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms](#)

12.15–13.00      Lunch Break

13.00–14.10      **3<sup>rd</sup> Session      Chair: tba**

**Bnaya Dreyfus** (Harvard University) or **Ofer Glicksohn**


(Hebrew University of Jerusalem):

[Deferred Acceptance with News Utility](#)

**Peter Katuscak** (RWTH Aachen University):

“Do People Misreport in Strategy-Proof Mechanisms to Avoid Disappointment?”

14.10–14.35      Coffee Break



14.35–16.20      4<sup>th</sup> Session    Chair: tba

**Yuki Tamura** (NYU Abu Dhabi):

“A Characterization of Obviously Strategy-proof Rules for Object Reallocation Problems with Single-peaked Preferences”

**Clayton Thomas** (Princeton University):

[Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions](#)

**Ori Heffetz** (Princeton University):

“Explaining Deferred Acceptance to Participants: Experimental Analysis”

16.30      **Neue Nationalgalerie Private Tour**

19.00      *Conference Dinner. By Invitation Only*

**Friday, July 14, 2023**

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9.30–10.40      1<sup>st</sup> Session:    Chair: tba

**Timm Opitz** (Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition):

[Everyone Likes to be Liked: Experimental Evidence from Matching Markets](#)

**Peter Troyan** (University of Virginia):


“Rankings-Dependent Preferences: A Real Goods Matching Experiment”

10.40–11.10      Coffee Break

11.10–12.55      2<sup>nd</sup> Session:    Chair: tba

**Anna Bogomolnaia** (University of Glasgow):

“tba”



**Christian Basteck** (WZB):

“On the Constrained Efficiency of Strategy-proof Random Assignment”

**Lars Ehlers** (University of Montreal):

“Existence of Myopic-Farsighted Stable Sets in Matching Markets”

12.55–13.45 *Lunch Break*

13.45–15.30      **3<sup>rd</sup> Session: Chair: tba**

**Ran Shorrer** (Penn State):  
“tba”

**Li Chen** (University of Gothenburg):

[Respecting Priorities Versus Respecting Preferences in School Choice: When is There a Trade-off?](#)

**Inacio Bo** (Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China):  
“tba”

15.30–16.00      Coffee Break

16.00–17.45      **4<sup>th</sup> Session: Chair: tba**

**Aytek Erdil** (University of Cambridge):

[Widening Access in University Admissions](#)

**Irene Lo** (Stanford University):

“Designing School Choice for Diversity in the San Francisco Unified School District”

**Rustamdjan Hakimov** (University of Lausanne):

[Confidence and College Applications: Evidence from a Randomized Intervention](#)

17.45–17.50      **Closing Remarks**

18.00      *Informal Dinner. By Invitation Only*

*(Changes updated March 28)*

