Dr. Justin Valasek
Former Staff Member of the Research Department
Research fields
Applied Economic Theory | Political Economy
CV
since September 2018 Associate Professor at the Norwegian School of Economics
2012-2020 Research Fellow, Research Unit "Economics of Change" at the WZB
2011- 2012 Max Weber Fellow, European University Institute.
2011 Ph.D. Economics, Duke University, (Supervisor: Prof. Rachel Kranton).
Research Justin's main research interests are in Applied Microeconomic Theory, Experimental Economics, Political Economy, Public Choice, Development and Behavioral Economics.
Selected Publications
Wzbaktiv
Breitmoser, Yves
/Valasek, Justin (2017): A Rationale for Unanimity in Committees. WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2017-308. Berlin: WZB.
Valasek, Justin Mattias (2015): Dynamic Reform of Public Institutions. A Model of Motivated Agents and Collective Reputation. WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2015-303r. Berlin: WZB. (first published June 2015 under the Title "Reforming an Institutional Culture of Corruption. A Model of Motivated Agents and Collective Reputation", revised October 2016)
Duell, Dominik/Valasek, Justin Mattias (2017): Social Identity and Political Polarization. Evidence on the Impact of Identity on Partisan Voting Trade. WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2017-304. Berlin: WZB.
Midjord, Rune/Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás/Valasek, Justin (2017): "Voting in Large Committees with Disesteem Payoffs. A 'State of the Art' Model". In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 104, S. 430–443.
Simon, Jenny/Valasek, Justin Mattias (2017): "Centralized Fiscal Spending by Supranational Unions". In: Economica, Vol. 84, No. 333, S. 78-103. (vorab online publiziert 08.04.2016)
Grohn, Jan/Huck, Steffen/Valasek, Justin Mattias (2014): "A Note On Empathy in Games". In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 108, Special Issue "Institutions, Games, and Experiments, in Honor of Werner Güth", edited by Martin Dufwenberg and Axel Ockenfels, S. 383–388.
Valasek, Justin Mattias (2012): "Get out the Vote. How Encouraging Voting Changes Political Outcomes". In: Economics and Politics, Vol. 24, No. 3, S. 346–373.