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Discussion papers

Research Area Markets and Choice

Research Unit Market Behavior2017 | 2016 | 2015 | 2014 | 2013 | 2012 | 2011 | 2010
Research Unit Economics of Change2018 | 2017 | 2016 | 2015 | 2014 | 2013 | 2012
Completed WZB Junior Research Group Risk and Development2015 | 2014 | 2013 | 2012
Research Professorship Market Design: Theory and Pragmatics2018 | 2017 | 2016 | 2015

Market Behavior

2017
SP II 2017–203 (PDF-Version)
Thomas Buser, Eva Ranehill, Roel van Veldhuizen
Gender Differences in Willingness to Compete: The Role of Public Observability
18 p.
SP II 2017–202 (PDF-Version)
Dietmar Fehr, Julia Schmid
Exclusion in the All-Pay Auction: An Experimental Investigation
(Revised version of the WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2014-206)
44 p.
SP II 2017–201 (PDF-Version)
Dorothea Kübler, Julia Schmid, Robert Stüber
Be a Man or Become a Nurse: Comparing Gender Discrimination by Employers across a Wide Variety of Professions
52 p.
2016
SP II 2016–215 (PDF-Version)
Michael Jakob, Dorothea Kübler, Jan Christoph Steckel, Roel van Veldhuizen
Clean up your own mess: An experimental study of moral responsibility and efficiency
26 p.
SP II 2016–214 (PDF-Version)
Tobias König, Tobias Lausen, Andreas Wagener
Image Concerns and the Political Economy of Publicly Provided Private Goods
40 p.
SP II 2016–213 (PDF-Version)
Tobias König, Tobias Lausen
Relative Consumption Preferences and Public Provision of Private Goods
48 p.
SP II 2016–212 (PDF-Version)
Inácio Bó, Rustamdjan Hakimov
The Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism
28 p.
SP II 2016–211 (PDF-Version)
Rustamdjan Hakimov
Contests at the workplace with and without prize selection.Testing theory in a field experiment
35 p.
SP II 2016–210 (PDF-Version)
Marie-Pierre Dargnies, Rustamdjan Hakimov, Dorothea Kübler
Self-confidence and unraveling in matching markets
44 p.
SP II 2016–209 (PDF-Version)
Inácio Bó, Rustamdjan Hakimov
Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: Experimental evidence
38 p.
SP II 2016–208 (PDF-Version)
Jana Friedrichsen, Tobias König, Renke Schmacker
Welfare stigma in the lab: Evidence of social signaling
28 p.
SP II 2016–207 (PDF-Version)
Roel van Veldhuizen
Gender Differences in Tournament Choices: Risk Preferences, Overconfidence or Competitiveness?
52 p.
SP II 2016–206 (PDF-Version)
Marina Agranov, Jacob K. Goeree, Julian Romero, Leeat Yariv
What makes voters turn out: The effects of polls and beliefs
40 p.
SP II 2016–205 (PDF-Version)
Manuela Angelucci, Silvia Prina, Heather Royer, Anya Samek
When Incentives Backfire: Spillover Effects in Food Choice
43 p.
SP II 2016–204 (PDF-Version)
Inácio Bó, C.-Philipp Heller
Strategic Schools under the Boston Mechanism Revisited
21 p.
SP II 2016–203 (PDF-Version)
Uri Gneezy, Silvia Saccardo, Roel van Veldhuizen
Bribery: Greed versus Reciprocity
91 p.
SP II 2016–202 (PDF-Version)
Jana Friedrichsen
Signals Sell: Designing a Product Line when Consumers Have Social Image Concerns
60 p.
SP II 2016-201 (PDF-Version)
David Danz, Steffen Huck, Philippe Jehiel
Public statistics and private experience: Varying feedback information in a take-or-pass game
25 p.
2015
SP II 2015–209 (PDF-Version)
Dietmar Fehr
Is Increasing Inequality Harmful? Experimental Evidence
20 p.
SP II 2015–208 (PDF-Version)
Pablo Guillen, Rustamdjan Hakimov
How to Get Truthful Reporting in Matching Markets: A Field Experiment
24 p.
SP II 2015–207 (PDF-Version)
Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers, Lars-Gunnar Svensson
Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Mechanism Design Approach
30 p.
SP II 2015–206 (PDF-Version)
Julia Schmid
Voluntary Industry Standards: An Experimental Investigation of a Greek Gift
29 p.
SP II 2015–205 (PDF-Version)
Dorothea Kübler, Julia Schmid
Take your time to grow: A field experiment on the hiring of youths in Germany
18 p.
SP II 2015–204 (PDF-Version)
Dietmar Fehr, Rustamdjan Hakimov, Dorothea Kübler
The Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap: A Failed Replication of Plott and Zeiler
37 p.
SP II 2015–203 (PDF-Version)
Onur Kesten, Morimitsu Kurino, Alexander Nesterov
Efficient Lottery Design
37 p.