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Methods of preference aggregation have received a wealth of attention in the literature on voting behavior, yet, as compared to individual voters, similar processes within international organizations (IOs) have received relatively little attention even as states continue to delegate increasingly more decision-making to international institutions. The way in which international decisions are made and the methods used to aggregate state preferences can have significant consequences for international politics. Thus, this project considers how formal voting rules are selected in IOs and considers the variation in methods of preference aggregation.

This project examines the ability of small states to achieve favorable outcomes in negotiations in international institutions. The decision to participate in an international institution is voluntary, even for small states. Dominant theories suggest that powerful states join international organizations because they can control the design of these institutions and solidify their resources by doing so. If these institutions are not beneficial then these states cease to participate. However few theories question the wide participation of the "losers" of international organizational design—small states. Accordingly, I argue that under certain conditions small states are the primary beneficiaries of institutional design.